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A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR DEBT RELIEF 
CHRYSTIN ONDERSMA 
Abstract 
 
This project begins to answer the question:  How might human rights 
obligations and standards inform lawmaking around remedies for over-
indebted individuals?  Recently, policymakers in Europe have articulated 
a desire to incorporate human rights principles in their responses to 
consumer over-indebtedness.  However, there has been no comprehensive 
analysis of how human rights principles might inform the various 
responses to over-indebtedness.  Further, policy makers outside Europe, 
including those in the United States, have not even begun to consider a 
human rights based response to over-indebtedness.  This paper analyzes 
the human rights that are implicated in the responses to over-indebtedness 
and discusses how each right can be taken into account.  In undertaking 
this analysis, I suggest that a human rights based evaluation of nations’ 
responses to over-indebtedness must be contextualized in nations’ 
background rules including 1) the available social safety net, 2) the nature 
of consumer credit contracts that default laws permit to exist, and 3) 
permissible collection methods. This project should be particularly useful 
for two groups:  1) those drafting or proposing legislation addressing 
consumer over-indebtedness who are members of countries that have 
undertaken specific human rights obligations and 2) lawmakers or 
policymakers who wish their proposed legislation to reflect cognizance of 
human rights principles even when not obligatory.  In addition, this 
project also illustrates how human rights informed responses to over-
indebtedness differ from the status quo in the United States. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As economies become ever more reliant on consumer credit 
fueled growth, nations have increasingly been required to decide 
whether and how to address the problem of household over-
indebtedness.  The human and economic consequences of 
consumer over-indebtedness have been felt even more sharply 
since the global financial crisis and its aftermath.  Consumer over-
indebtedness is both a broader economic problem and also a 
problem of human suffering.  Individuals carrying heavy debt 
burdens often experience shame, marginalization, exclusion, and 
the inability to meet their basic needs.1  In addition, the processes 
for collecting debt exacerbate this suffering.  In one incident in the 
United States, a son was unable to pay for his father’s cremation, 
and the creditor’s collection method was to leave the father’s dead 
body on the son’s front stoop with a sheet over it.2  In other cases, 
failure to pay debts can lead to imprisonment.3  Meanwhile, 
creditors also have valid concerns about losses stemming from 
debtors who are unable to pay, and the economy as a whole suffers 
because too many individuals have to devote their disposable 
income to servicing debt. 
Although much of the response to the global financial crisis has 
been macroeconomic (bank safety and soundness, new rules for 
derivatives trading, and so forth),4 there has also been discussion 
                                                     
1  Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force, Report on the 
Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons, WORLD BANK 1, 43 (Dec. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter World Bank Report], http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/0
2/000333037_20130502131241/Rendered/PDF/771700WP0WB0In00Box377289B0
0PUBLIC0.pdf.  
2  Son Can’t Pay, So Father’s Body Is Returned, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/14/us/son-can-t-pay-so-father-s-body-is-
returned.html. 
3  Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-
fees-multiply-as-companies-profit.html?smid=pl-share. 
4  See, e.g., Yacine Aït-Sahalia, Jochen Andritzky, Andreas Jobst, Sylwia 
Nowak & Natalia Tamirisa, Market Response to Policy Initiatives During the Global 
Financial Crisis, 87 J. INT’L ECON. 162 (2012), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~yacine/crisismarketresponse.pdf (assessing the 
impact of macroeconomic policy initiatives on the market during the financial 
crisis).  See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (delineating the Dodd-Frank laws passed 
after the financial crisis with the goal to support financial stability and protect 
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of reform to consumer insolvency regimes; that is, the legal system 
for resolving consumer over-indebtedness.  In the wake of the 2008 
global financial crisis, which left individuals in many countries 
struggling to meet their consumer debt obligations – mortgage 
obligations in particular – several countries radically revised their 
consumer insolvency laws, and others are considering 
implementing a consumer insolvency regime for the first time.5  
Furthermore, the World Bank issued a report reviewing the 
various insolvency regimes designed to address consumer over-
indebtedness.6 
In both the U.S. and abroad, responses to over-indebtedness 
have historically not considered or incorporated human rights 
principles.  Recently, however, European policymakers have 
expressed a desire to incorporate human rights principles into their 
approach to consumer over-indebtedness.  Yet this aspiration has 
not so far been followed by a comprehensive analysis of what 
human rights are implicated in the response to over-indebtedness 
and how they are implicated.  Only two scholars have analyzed the 
European human rights obligations for official insolvency systems, 
and they focused primarily on business insolvency.7  There has 
                                                     
consumers); M. Okan Tasar, Financial Regulations in the Process of Global Financial 
Crisis and Macroeconomics Impact of Basel III, 7 WORLD ACAD. SCI., ENG’G & TECH. 
601 (May 23, 2013), available at http://waset.org/publications/4063 (discussing 
Basel III, a global regulatory standard and its macroeconomic impacts); Jeremy 
Scott, The Faltering Financial Transaction Tax and the Future of Wall Street, FORBES 
(Sept. 19, 2013, 9:46 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2013/09/19/the-faltering-financial-
transaction-tax-and-the-future-of-wall-street/ (revisiting the Dodd-Frank Act and 
the Financial Transaction Tax and noting the failure of these efforts in re-
regulating the financial sector); Drew Singer, EU Official Makes Final Push on 
Financial Transaction Tax, LAW360 (Feb. 5, 2014, 4:37 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/507218/eu-official-makes-final-push-on-
financial-transaction-tax (considering both sides of the debate on the Financial 
Transaction Tax—a minimum 0.1 percent tax on nonderivative transactions and a 
minimum 0.01 percent tax on derivative transactions).  
5  Study on Means to Protect Consumers in Financial Difficulty: Personal 
Bankruptcy, Datio in Solutum of Mortgages, and Restrictions on Debt Collection Abusive 
Practices, LONDON ECON. 246-47 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter London Economics 
Report], http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-
retail/docs/fsug/papers/debt_solutions_report_en.pdf.  
6  See generally World Bank Report, supra note 1. 
7  See JAN C. VAN APELDOORN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, 12 
L.  BUS. & FIN. (2012); George Kodek, The Impact of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties on Insolvency Proceedings, in THE 
CHALLENGES OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 571-88 (Henry Peter, 
Nicolas Jeandin & Jason Kilborn eds., 2006) (describing insolvency proceedings as 
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been no human rights based analysis of the myriad issues 
pertaining to responses to consumer over-indebtedness that is 
contextualized in each nations’ background rules regarding the 
creation of credit, debt collection, and social welfare policies.  
There also has been only limited recognition that creditors’ human 
rights (such as rights to property and due process) may also be 
implicated in responses to over-indebtedness. 
Thus, although a number of policymakers have acknowledged 
the need to consider human rights concerns, human rights 
concerns have not actually been incorporated into responses to 
consumer over-indebtedness.  There is only limited guidance for 
lawmakers regarding how human rights concerns should be 
adequately accounted for in new laws targeted at treating over-
indebtedness. 
In Europe, where policymakers have expressed a desire to 
consider human rights principles, there is only an incomplete 
discussion of human rights implications for over-indebtedness. 
Policymakers outside Europe are even further behind, as they have 
not even begun to consider how human rights principles might 
influence responses to over-indebtedness.  The United States has 
long been thought to have the most liberal consumer bankruptcy 
regime, yet legal scholarship has yet to consider whether the U.S. 
response to over-indebtedness is consistent with human rights 
principles. 
This paper seeks to fill these gaps.  I identify the human rights 
obligations or standards that may be implicated in addressing 
consumer over-indebtedness.  In undertaking this analysis, I 
suggest that a human rights based evaluation of nations’ 
insolvency systems or lack thereof must be contextualized in 
nations’ background rules including:  1) the available social safety 
net, 2) the nature of consumer credit contracts that default laws 
                                                     
a guide to practice, but also mentioning the impact on human rights, such as, inter 
alia, protection of property, the right to protect private and family life, and 
freedom of movement).  Application of human rights principles to the resolution 
of insolvency has also been used in the foreign debt context.  The Human Rights 
Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights 
drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.  The 
Principles state that debt relief for overburdened debtor countries is to be 
considered in light of the human rights framework, including borrower states’ 
human rights obligations.  Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, 
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/GuidingPrincip
les.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
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permit to exist, and 3) permissible collection methods.  After 
discussing the human rights principles that may be implicated in 
nations’ response to consumer over-indebtedness, I suggest that 
efforts at harmonizing responses to consumer over-indebtedness 
that strive to reflect human rights concerns should acknowledge 
that a one-size-fits-all approach may not be appropriate given the 
varied background rules and practices.  I also suggest that if an 
insolvency regime is necessary to satisfy human rights concerns, 
the relief provided must be accessible and effective. 
In addition to providing a guide for how to incorporate human 
rights principles into responses to over-indebtedness, this analysis 
also highlights the gaps that result from failing to consider human 
rights principles.  In other words, responses to over-indebtedness 
that are fully cognizant of human rights principles would diverge 
from the status quo in many cases.  Because my expertise is in U.S. 
consumer over-indebtedness, I focus primarily on U.S. examples.  
These examples suggest that current responses to over-
indebtedness in the U.S. do not fully comply with human rights 
principles.  Although I focus on U.S. examples, my framework can 
be applied to laws around responses to over-indebtedness abroad. 
The nature of the response to over-indebtedness that human 
rights principles require depends upon the nature of experience of 
indebtedness itself in any given context.  This context includes both 
social norms and government policy.  With respect to social norms, 
for individuals in some countries, indebtedness itself may carry 
severe social stigma and shame.  For others, indebtedness itself 
may be acceptable, but declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency 
may be stigmatizing or shame-inducing.  There are also significant 
policy variations.  Consumer protection laws vary with respect to 
restrictions on the nature of the contract and also with respect to 
the collection methods permitted.  Welfare policies also vary 
substantially; each government has made its own policy judgment 
regarding the degree to which taxpayers will subsidize food, 
education, healthcare, and housing.  Finally, each jurisdiction 
provides varying degrees of default rights to creditors, particularly 
in determining when a contractual right of a secured creditor rises 
to a property right. 
In spite of – and in light of – these variations, a human rights 
framework may be a useful tool for establishing baseline 
protections of both debtors and creditors in treating consumer 
over-indebtedness.  Countries can choose among a variety of 
legislative options to ensure that the basic human rights of over-
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indebted individuals are not jeopardized.  Some countries may 
focus on providing robust social safety nets that ensure that 
individuals can meet their basic needs for food and housing.  Other 
countries may sharply circumscribe the debt collection methods 
available to creditors, for example, by restricting invasive 
collection practices and limiting the assets that can be seized or 
wages that can be garnished.  In effect, these countries aim to 
protect debtors’ rights to dignity, privacy, just remuneration, and 
freedom from discrimination.  If background rules leave the debtor 
exposed to human rights violations, the nation state could comply 
with human rights principles by maintaining or creating an 
accessible insolvency regime that permits the debtor to opt out of 
the default rules.  For example, initiation of consumer insolvency 
proceedings could trigger the immediate cessation of collection 
proceedings that would otherwise interfere with privacy rights, or 
insolvency proceedings could permit a discharge of debt such that 
the debtor retains sufficient income moving forward to meet the 
basic needs of herself or her dependents.  Similarly, insolvency 
regimes can complement rather than interfere with creditors’ 
human rights. 
A few words about what this paper does not do.  First, 
precisely because the human rights issues pertaining to the 
response to over-indebtedness will vary depending on the social 
and legal context, this discussion necessarily overlaps with broader 
concerns relating to over-indebtedness, including the regulation of 
financial institutions that participate in the consumer debt market.  
However, because regulation of business entities raises a host of 
additional issues – including whether and to what degree business 
entities themselves have human rights obligations – I have chosen 
to address separately the specific human rights concerns that arise 
at or prior to the time of contract creation.8  Second, this paper does 
not undertake the normative task of arguing that nations should 
approach consumer debt from a human rights standpoint – that 
work is done in a separate paper. 
Instead, this paper addresses the reality that some countries 
and organizations have stated a desire to incorporate human rights 
principles in treating over-indebtedness – and yet this desire has 
not so far been accompanied by an analysis of the human rights 
principles implicated in addressing over-indebtedness.  This paper 
                                                     
8  Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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takes that step, offering a human rights framework for responding 
to over-indebtedness.  This analysis will be useful for two groups: 
1) those drafting or proposing legislation addressing consumer 
over-indebtedness who are members of countries that have 
undertaken specific human rights obligations, and 2) lawmakers or 
policymakers who wish their proposed legislation to reflect 
cognizance of human rights principles even when not obligatory.  
In addition, for countries like the United States that have not yet 
considered human rights principles in responding to over-
indebtedness, this paper illustrates some of the ways in which 
responses to over-indebtedness that reflect cognizance of human 
rights principles would differ from the status quo. 
This paper proceeds as follows:  Part 2 briefly discusses the 
problem of consumer over-indebtedness and the various responses 
for treating over-indebtedness that have emerged.  Part 3 provides 
a brief overview of the human rights system so that the reader 
unfamiliar with the human rights regime will understand the 
circumstances under which the human rights standards and 
obligations discussed in subsequent parts can be implemented or 
enforced.  In Part 4, I briefly review each human rights principle 
that could potentially be implicated in addressing consumer over-
indebtedness.  In undertaking this application, I consider whether 
an insolvency regime could ameliorate the human rights concerns 
raised by application of the principle in question, whether an 
insolvency regime is necessary to address these human rights 
concerns, and what may be required for the insolvency regime 
itself to account for the human rights concerns.  This analysis 
emphasizes that a human rights based approach to over-
indebtedness must be contextualized in a nation’s background 
rules.  Because the human rights discussed in Part 4 are primarily 
at issue for consumer debtors, the analysis is debtor focused.  Part 
5 undertakes a more detailed analysis of two specific human rights:  
the rights to property and due process rights.  I focus on these 
rights separately because they implicate debtors and creditors to an 
equal degree and this analysis highlights the need to balance 
debtors’ and creditors’ rights.  Part 6 summarizes the insights that 
emerge from this analysis; namely, efforts at harmonizing 
responses to consumer over-indebtedness that strive to reflect 
human rights concerns should acknowledge that a one-size-fits-all 
approach may not be appropriate given the varied background 
rules and practices.  Part 7 concludes by offering some benefits of a 
human-rights-compliant response to over-indebtedness. 
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2. THE PROBLEM OF OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND RESPONSES 
 
2.1. The Rise of Over-Indebtedness 
 
Consumer over-indebtedness has rapidly arisen as a 
paramount concern in a number of countries.9  This paper 
implicates the broad array of responses to over-indebtedness in 
addition to the narrower and over-lapping issues of insolvency and 
bankruptcy.  The Council of Europe considers over-indebtedness 
to cover “at least” those “situations where the debt burden of an 
individual or a family continuously and/or manifestly exceeds its 
payment capacity, resulting in systematic difficulties, and 
sometimes in failure, in paying the creditors.”10  The World Bank 
Report arrived at a similar definition of over-indebtedness, 
describing it as “the debtor’s ongoing inability to service current 
obligations on all outstanding obligations as they become due.”11  
My discussion of the response to over-indebtedness is designed to 
cover the same territory as the World Bank Report’s discussion of 
nations’ “treatment of insolvency,” which the Report calls “any 
system for alleviating the burdens of excessive debt and allocating 
benefits and losses, both among creditors and as between creditors 
and natural person debtors[.]”12 
Over the past thirty years, household debt has risen 
exponentially among many developed and developing countries.13  
Prior to 1975, household debt seldom rose above 75% of annual 
income.  By 2000, U.K. and U.S. household debt was equivalent to 
twelve months’ income.14  The U.S. Federal Reserve reported an 
                                                     
9  See generally, e.g., INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO ISSUES OF CREDIT AND OVER-
INDEBTEDNESS IN THE WAKE OF CRISIS (Therese Wilson ed., 2013).  
10  COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)8 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems, ¶ 16 
[hereinafter Council of Europe Recommendation], 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/CDC¶J%20Recommendations
/CMRec(2007)8E_et%20expose.pdf.  
11  World Bank Report, supra note 1, ¶ 39. 
12  Id. ¶ 17. 
13  Tyler Durden, The Debt of Nations, ZERO HEDGE (June 4, 2013, 6:36 PM), 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-06-04/debt-nations. 
14  Id. 
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increase of credit card debt from $11 billion in 1973 to $770.5 billion 
in 2003 – about $6,950 per household.15  Household debt burdens 
also increased exponentially in Russia (by a factor of 20 between 
2000 and 2007); the average debt now amounts to over $15,000, 
where the average annual income is only $7,500.16  Between 2007 
and 2010, household debt increased 35%in the Netherlands, 21% in 
Greece, and 18% in Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic.17  
In terms of total household debt, Denmark, Norway, and 
Switzerland have the highest household debt loads on average 
(above $100,000 in 2012).  Ireland and the Netherlands have close 
to $80,000 in average household debt, while Canada, Sweden, the 
U.S., the U.K., and Singapore have between $40,000 and $60,000 in 
average household debt.  This compares to lower levels in Spain 
($31,200), Portugal ($25,800), Italy ($23,900), and Greece ($19,000).18 
Given the nature of debt – if it cannot be timely serviced it 
grows quickly, and can grow exponentially if interest rates are 
high – over-indebtedness often entails a “downward spiral of 
growing indebtedness from which the debtor cannot escape 
without intervention[.]”19  The intervention may take the form of 
some kind of insolvency regime or other protection against debt 
enforcement.20  Common triggers of over-indebtedness include 
“unemployment, illness, divorce, or other income interruption or 
unexpected expense.”21  In the U.S., the housing crisis left many 
unable to meet their mortgage obligations.  In addition, as bank 
losses infected the real economy, unemployment increased, leaving 
many families to rely on credit to fill the gap between income and 
expenses.22 
                                                     
15  Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Consumer 
Credit Historical Data, Table G.19, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/release/g19hist/cc_hist_r.txt. 
16  Fear over Default as Personal Bank Debt in Russia Doubles in Two Years, 
RUSSIA TODAY (last updated July 29, 2013, 1:23 PM), 
http://rt.com/business/russia-banks-people-debt-double-732/. 
17 OECD (2012), National Accounts of OECD Countries, OECD Publishing, 
summary available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013-
en/03/03/02/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-28-en. 
18  Durden, supra note 13. 
19  World Bank Report, supra note 1, ¶ 39. 
20  Durden, supra note 13. 
21  Id. 
22  Patricia McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 728 (2013)  (citing John Kiff & Vladimir Klyuev, Staff Position 
Note, Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts in the United States: Approaches and 
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2.2. Insolvency Reform 
 
As the financial crisis and its associated debt woes infected 
countries around the globe, many countries without consumer 
insolvency regimes adopted or considered adopting consumer 
debt relief measures.23  Latvia, Slovenia, and Poland initiated 
individual discharge laws.24  Sweden radically reformed its 
bankruptcy laws to speed up relief and strictly limited repayment 
plans longer than five years.25  The Netherlands reformed their 
debt settlement procedures and allowed discharge of debt after one 
year rather than three and also allowed courts to force creditors to 
accept debtors’ proposed out-of-court plans.  The U.K. introduced 
debt relief orders.  France introduced laws permitting immediate 
discharge over the dissent of creditors.26  Greece introduced 
personal discharge for consumers.27  Ireland and Germany both 
reformed its bankruptcy laws to permit discharge after three years 
of plan repayment.28  Austria also proposed personal bankruptcy 
reform.29  Italy introduced consumer bankruptcy procedures 
permitting a discharge after a four-year repayment period.30  
                                                     
Challenges, INT’L MONETARY FUND, STAFF POSITION NOTE (SPN/09/02, 2009), at 4-5 
(2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0902.pdf.  
Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) that were particularly troubling were 2/28 or 
3/27 ARMs, interest-only ARMs, and option payment ARMs.  Id.  “By early 2012, 
U.S. housing prices had fallen 33% since their 2006 high, wiping out about $7 
trillion in household equity. It was the nation’s most severe housing price decline 
since the Great Depression.”  Id. at 729 (citing BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 3 (2012)). 
23  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at 7. 
24  Id. at 246.  
25  Id.  
26  Id.  
27  Nomos (2007:3588) [Insolvency Code], 2007 (Greece); Fek [Page of the 
Paper of the Government], 2007, A/10.7.2007, amended by Nomos (2012:4072) 
[Improvement of the Corporate Environment – New Corporate Form – 
Trademarks – Real Estate – Regulation of Issues Relating to Shipping, Ports, 
Fishing and Other Provisions], 2012 (Greece).  
28  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at 247. 
29  Id. 
30  Legge 27 gennaio 2012, n. 3, in G.U., Jan. 30, 2012, n. 24 (It.) [Law of Jan. 
27, 2012, no. 3], Disposizioni in Materia di Usura e di Estorsione, Nonche’ di 
Composizione delle Crisi da Sovraindebitamento) [Regulation on Usury and 
Extortion, as well as on Settlement of Overindebtedness Crises].  
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Colombia introduced discharge proceedings in 2012.31  Although 
Russia has not yet adopted a consumer insolvency regime, alarm 
over growing consumer over-indebtedness has prompted 
discussion about reforms.32 
The U.S. considered but rejected changes to its bankruptcy laws 
that would have permitted mortgages to be modified in 
bankruptcy.  In spite of the proposed amendment’s defeat, some 
bankruptcy courts are aiding the modification of mortgages in 
bankruptcy through loss mitigation programs.33  A number of state 
and federal programs also attempted to provide opportunities for 
mortgage modification, but unfortunately, the programs have 
saved far fewer homes than anticipated.34 
 
2.3. Budding Efforts to Consider Human Rights Principles in 
Responding to Over-Indebtedness 
 
In the past decade, the problem of over-indebtedness has 
begun to be recognized as a human rights concern in Europe.  Even 
before the financial crisis, the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, which is charged with implementing the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), issued a report 
discussing the human rights implications for consumer over-
indebtedness and proposing possibilities for harmonizing 
responses to over-indebtedness.35  The Recommendation 
concluded that “over-indebtedness [in addition to poverty and 
consumer insolvency]36 may lead to social and health problems 
                                                     
31  Código General Del Proceso [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 571(1).  
32  RUSSIA TODAY, supra note 17. 
33  Tara Siegel Bernard, Losing Homes in the Wait for a Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, May 
14, 2009, at B1; see also generally Adam Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: 
Modification of Home Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wisconsin L. Rev. 565, 565-640 
(2009); Hon. Cecilia Morris & Mary K. Guccion, The Loss Mitigation Program 
Procedures for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011). 
34  See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons 
from the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 
52. ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 744–68 (2010) (examining the disappointing results of the 
HAMP program in terms of the low numbers of struggling homeowners whose 
homes were saved).  
35 Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10. 
36  When I use the term “insolvency,” I include not only balance sheet 
insolvency but also the inability to service one’s debt obligations as they come 
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and exclusion of individuals and families from society[.]”37  The 
Recommendation did not, however, discuss the myriad of human 
rights that are implicated in addressing consumer over-
indebtedness.  In fact, the only human right specifically mentioned 
in the report was human dignity.  Similarly, while the World Bank 
Report on the treatment of consumer over-indebtedness 
acknowledged in a passing sentence that there may be human 
rights implications for insolvency regimes, the Report does not 
offer specific guidance on the human rights standards or 
obligations that are implicated in addressing over-indebtedness.38  
Finally, the Financial Services User Group published a policy 
report recommending that each EU member country have a 
consumer insolvency regime, and that “recognised fundamental 
rights and the dignity of human beings should be at the core of any 
insolvency/restructuring regime.”39  However, the policy report 
failed to identify the human rights at issue or discuss what would 
be necessary for a consumer insolvency regime to comply with 
human rights. 
The European Ministers of Justice of the Council of Europe, 
who are responsible for implementing the European Convention 
on Human Rights,40 met in 2005 for their 26th conference to discuss 
legal solutions to over-indebtedness consistent with human rights 
principles.41  They adopted a Resolution (Resolution No. 1 on 
                                                     
due.  Balance sheet insolvency is both under and over-inclusive.  Many 
individuals are insolvent (for example, new home owners and college graduates 
with hefty student loan debt) but are capable of servicing their debt and meeting 
their basic needs.  Some individuals have modest assets (a home, perhaps) but 
have a liquidity crisis: an elderly individual with fixed income and medical debt, 
for example.  Such an individual may be over-indebted and their human rights 
may be at risk even if the value of their home exceeds their medical liabilities. 
37  Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10, ¶ 17. 
38  See generally World Bank Report, supra note 1. 
39 Study on Means to Protect Consumers in Financial Difficulty: Personal 
Bankruptcy, Datio in Solutum of Mortgages, and Restrictions on Debt Collection Abusive 
Practices, FIN. SERVS. USER GROUP, at 5, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-
retail/docs/fsug/papers/debt_solutions_research_study_position_en.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
40  JASON J. KILBORN, EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE TREATMENT OF OVERINDEBTEDNESS, 1984-2010, 11 
L. BUS. & FIN. 10 (2011).  
41  26th Conference of European Ministers of Justice, Resolution No. 1 on 
Seeking Legal Solutions to Debt Problems in a Credit Society at the 26th 
Conference of European Ministers of Justice, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Helsinki Apr. 7-
8, 2005) [hereinafter Helsinki Resolution], 
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Seeking Legal Solutions to Debt Problems in a Credit Society)42 
addressing the issue of over-indebtedness.43  The Committee of 
Ministers emphasized the need to address over-indebtedness in 
light of human rights obligations44 and tasked the European 
Committee on Legal Cooperation (CDCJ) with “prepar[ing] an 
appropriate instrument defining legislative and administrative 
measures, and proposing practical remedies.”45 The CDCJ 
responded by drafting a report entitled “[l]egal solutions to debt 
problems”46 which the Committee of Ministers then adopted.  The 
Recommendation describes the problem of over-indebtedness as a 
situation that “frequently leads to social and health problems and 
social exclusion of families and may put children’s basic needs at 
risk.”47  In its recommendation pertaining to debt recovery, the 
CDCJ emphasized the need to “respect[] the debtor’s rights and 
human dignity at all stages of debt collection and debt enforcement 
procedures without infringing on the rights of creditors[.]”48  The 
scope of debt collection is also limited by the requirement that the 
debtor retain “essential assets” as well as “basic living needs of the 
debtor and his/her family[.]”49  Furthermore, the CDCJ issued 
recommendations pertaining to the rehabilitation of the debtor, 
emphasizing that repayment plans should be “reasonable”50 and 
that discharge should be available where “other measures have 
proved to be ineffective” and “with a view to providing . . . 
[debtors] a new opportunity for engaging in economic and social 
activities[.]”51 
The Council of Europe prepared a document responding to the 
report with specific areas for government action.52  The action areas 
                                                     
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/minjust/mju26/MJU-
26(2005)Res1E.pdf.  
42  European Ministers of Justice, Resolution Seeking Legal Solutions to Debt 
Problems in a Credit Society (MJU-26 (2005) Resol. 1). 
43  Helsinki Resolution, supra note 41. 
44  Id. ¶ 7, at 2. 
45   Id. ¶ 12, at 2. 
46  Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10. 
47  Id. at 5, pmbl. 
48  Id. ¶ 3(b), at 6. 
49  Id. ¶ 3(c), at 7. 
50  Id. ¶ 4(b), at 7. 
51  Id. ¶ 4(h), at 8. 
52  Id. ¶ 5(a)-(e), at 8.  The six specific action areas are:  
1. “setting up policies relating to debt management and to treatment of 
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include establishing policies for debt management and the 
responses to the over-indebted, ensuring “the quality of all services 
related to over-indebtedness and the impartiality of providers,”53 
encouraging participation of lenders, and establishing “easy access 
to information about consumer rights” and financial management 
awareness.54  The Council of Europe also responded with specific 
solutions for the prevention of over-indebtedness,55 alleviation of 
the effects of over-indebtedness,56 and rehabilitation of the over-
indebted.57  The Council specifically addressed the need to respect 
the debtor’s “human dignity” in the debt collection process,58 and 
focused on the need to encourage the financial and social inclusion 
of over-indebted individuals.59 
                                                     
over-indebted individuals and families and ensuring uniformity of such 
policies,” 2. “ensuring effective co-operation between the competent 
bodies and the professionals involved . . . ,” 3. “setting up debt advice, 
counselling and mediation mechanisms, as well as ensuring, or at least 
encouraging, effective participation of lending institutions . . . in 
implementing national policies for debt management; d. ensuring 
appropriate quality [] and impartiality of [] services . . . [related to over-
indebtedness],” 4. “providing easy access to information about consumer 
rights and . . . [promoting awareness in relation to financial 
management].”   
53  Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10, ¶ 42, at 19. 
54  Id. ¶ 5(e), at 8.  
55  Id. ¶ 2(a)-(e), at 6.  Prevention:  
1. “collecting information and statistics on debt problems and analysing 
the situation,” 2. “introducing . . . financial literacy . . . and budget 
management . . . [in] national education system,” 3. “effective access to 
impartial financial, social and legal advice and counseling,” 4. 
“providing the necessary measures and regulations to ensure responsible 
practices during all phases of the credit relationship,” 5. “safeguarding 
the rights of the guarantors to information.”   
Id.   
56  Id. ¶ 3(a)-(e), at 6-7.  Alleviation of effects:  
1. “ensuring an efficient . . . enforcement system as well as appropriate 
legislation,” 2. “respecting the debtor’s rights and human dignity . . . [in] 
debt enforcement procedures,” 3. “introducing enforcement alleviation 
procedures, including the protection of the essential assets of the 
debtor,” 4. “ensuring the rights of the guarantors . . . at all stages of debt 
enforcement procedure,” 5. “recognition and enforcement . . . of payment 
judgments and repayment plans.”   
Id. 
57  Id. ¶ 4(a)-(h), at 7-8. 
58  Id. ¶ 3(b), at 6. 
59  Id. ¶ 4(a)-(h), at 7-8.  Rehabilitation:  
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In spite of the mandate to consider the human rights 
implications of over-indebtedness, the Council did not undertake 
any further analysis regarding which human rights obligations or 
standards might be implicated in addressing over-indebtedness. 
The Report and Recommendations seem to be focused around the 
treatment of over-indebtedness as a human dignity concern.  The 
Report does acknowledge that over-indebtedness can interfere 
with the ability of debtors to meet basic needs, but these concerns 
are considered in passing rather than analyzed.  In other words, 
the Report does not undertake the task of suggesting what specific 
changes may be necessitated by human rights principles.  In 
addition, concerns involving discrimination, equality, and 
property are absent.  Outside of Europe, including in the United 
States, human rights concerns have been absent from discussions 
around solutions for consumer over-indebtedness. 
 
3. OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND BODIES 
 
This Part undertakes two objectives.  First, it provides a brief 
overview of the human rights instruments that encapsulate the 
human rights standards pursuant to which I will consider the 
efforts to address situations of over-indebtedness.  Second, it 
provides a brief overview of human rights bodies that have the 
capacity to enforce human rights obligations; in other words, it 
begins to show how some nations can be held accountable for 
human rights violations.  I discuss the functions and instruments of 
the United Nations and of the regional human rights bodies, and I 
acknowledge that domestic legislation can also address human 
rights.  This framework is essential to understanding the analysis 
that follows, in which I apply these human rights standards to the 
responses to over-indebtedness.  This Part will be amply familiar to 
                                                     
1. “ensuring that debtors have effective access to impartial advice and to 
debt adjustment [procedures], 2. “ensuring that debt adjustment covers 
all debts,” 3. “establishing . . .  extra-judicial settlements . . . between the 
debtor and creditor,” 4. “limiting the means of creditors to hinder debt 
settlements unreasonably,” 5. “encouraging [] financial and social 
inclusion of over-indebted individuals,” 6. “encouraging [] active 
participation of the debtor in debt settlement, 7. “allowing partial or total 
discharge of the debts of individuals and . . . families.”   
Id.  
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those working and writing in the human rights field; human rights 
scholars and practitioners should skip this Part and begin reading 
Part 5. 
By “human rights obligations” I refer to the minimum human 
rights obligations that a nation or other state actor is bound to 
provide by force of law.  Human rights obligations vary 
substantially from country to country and even from city to city.  
In the United States, for example, some states and municipalities 
have adopted human rights obligations beyond what the United 
States is obliged to guarantee by treaty.60  Redress and enforcement 
mechanisms also vary substantially; some nations may have 
agreed to abide by human rights obligations in principle but have 
not agreed to be subject to review or enforcement actions, whereas 
others have given human rights instruments the force of national 
law and/or have agreed to be subject to review by an international 
human rights body.61 
By “human rights standards,” in contrast to “human rights 
obligations,” I refer to the human rights that most nations have 
acknowledged and aspire to protect, even where an enforcement 
mechanism is lacking.  Recognized rights include those human 
rights described in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of which are 
treaties.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
preceded these treaties, also sets forth a number of commonly 
accepted human rights, many of which were later incorporated 
into the ICCPR and ICESCR.  The human rights instruments 
adopted by regional bodies that have undertaken human rights 
obligations reflect many of the same standards enshrined in these 
documents.  
Not every human rights standard gives rise to a remedy in the 
event of violation.  Although most countries accept the human 
rights described in the International Bill of Human Rights, redress 
is not available for every human rights violation.62  Redress is 
                                                     
60  See, e.g., Maine Human Rights Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 5, §§ 4551-634 
(2013) (defining “disability” in 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(7-A) in a wider sense than the 
definition provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act).  
61  Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (1998) (U.K.). 
62   
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, 
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the 
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available only if the country accused of the violation has agreed to 
be held accountable by an international or regional human rights 
body, or if the right is protected by domestic law.  Moreover, 
national law is the primary mechanism for protection of human 
rights, and human rights can be protected in national law without 
such legislation being explicitly labeled as pertaining to human 
rights.  For example, many constitutions protect rights identified as 
human rights, including privacy, free speech, freedom from 
slavery, and freedom from discrimination. 
Typically international human rights remedies will not be 
available until victims of human rights abuses have exhausted 
available national remedies.63  Additionally, human rights bodies 
violations are typically only redressable if state action perpetrates 
the violation.  Although there is a movement toward the 
recognition of states’ “positive obligations” to prevent private 
actors from violating human rights, most enforcement mechanisms 
are addressed at violations of states’ “negative obligations” to 
refrain from interfering with human rights.64  Note, however, that 
whenever the state lends the force of its legal apparatus to private 
actors (such as debt collectors), state action is at work.  Further, 
even when no enforcement mechanism compels positive 
obligations, nation states concerned about the human rights issues 
                                                     
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures 
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, art. 2(2) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www.ihumanrights.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/ccpr1.pdf.  
63  MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA CARMONA, INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL’Y, 
CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION 11 (Robert Archer ed., 
2009), http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/40/131_web.pdf; OFF. OF THE U.N. 
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (OHCHR), 23 Frequently Asked Questions About Treaty 
Body Complaints Procedures [hereinafter OHCHR Frequently Asked Questions], 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/23FAQ.pdf (last visited Jan. 
24, 2014); OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (OHCHR), Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies—Individual Communications, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommuni
cations.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
64  Jean François Akandji-Kombe, Council of Europe, Positive Obligations 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. HANDBOOKS 1, 10 
(2007) (explaining the difference between positive and negative obligations); see 
generally Dinah Shelton and Ariel Gould, Positive and Negative Obligations, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 562 (Dina Shelton ed., 
2013). 
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raised here may wish to voluntarily adhere to human rights 
standards. 
I use the term “human rights principles” to include both 
human rights obligations and human rights standards; that is, I 
discuss adherence to human rights principles with the recognition 
that failure to consider the principle will not, in many cases, be a 
redressable human rights violation.  Thus, while this section gives 
a sense of which human rights standards are accompanied by 
human rights obligations, my analysis that follows is not an 
analysis of what human rights law requires but rather asks what 
adherence to the human rights standard would look like, even if 
failure to satisfy this standard would not be penalized. 
This manner of considering human rights – as principles worth 
following even absent a legal consequence for failure to follow 
them – carries some challenges.  In order to decide what conduct 
human rights principles urge, it may be necessary to elucidate the 
content of each principle.  But it makes little sense to attempt to do 
so without considering any of the case law interpreting the 
principles.  On the other hand, the case law will vary and perhaps 
conflict from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and it would be 
impossible, in the confines of this paper, to fully explore all human 
rights case law everywhere.  Hence, I try here to draw upon case 
law in a limited manner; that is, I mention cases where useful to 
shed light on the content of a human rights principle in 
circumstances particularly relevant to the context of nations’ 
responses to over-indebtedness.65 
 
3.1. Human Rights and the United Nations 
 
3.1.1. Human Rights Instruments of the United Nations 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted in 1948, recognizes civil and political 
                                                     
65  There is one resource available that discusses the human rights obligations 
under the European Convention that arise in insolvency cases.  See generally 
APELDOORN, supra note 7.  The book’s discussion is limited to the European 
Convention and is also limited to obligations related to insolvency regimes, not 
overall methods for addressing over-indebtedness.  Id.  
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rights as well as the “economic, social and cultural rights” that are 
“indispensable” for “dignity and the free development of [] 
personality.”66  The Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty 
and does not give rise to enforcement mechanisms, but it is 
referenced in the preamble to treaties subsequently enacted and is 
sometimes considered part of “customary” international law.67  In 
addition, the 1968 United Nations International Conference on 
Human Rights stated that the Declaration “constitutes an 
obligation for the members of the international community.”68  In 
setting forth economic rights, the Declaration affirms the right to 
“just and favorable remuneration” that ensures “for [each person] 
and [his or her] family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection” 
for each individual and his or her family.69  In addition, it affirms 
the right to rest and leisure,70 and the right to “a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of [each person and his or 
her] family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care . . . 
.”71 
That said, many (if not most) of the rights espoused in the 
Declaration are not accompanied with any remedy in the event of 
violation, and some do not consider “human dignity” to be a 
human right.  However, that does not mean that policymakers will 
not want their responses to over-indebtedness to reflect the human 
rights concerns raised in the Declaration.  Indeed, in its short 
Recommendation, the Council of Europe focused primarily on the 
need for responses to over-indebtedness to respect human 
                                                     
66  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 22 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
67  Whether the UDHR forms part of customary international law is a subject 
of much debate.  See generally ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PROCESS AND PROSPECT 123-47 (1986); MYERS S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & 
LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF 
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 273-74, 325-27 (1977); J.P. Humphrey, 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21, 37 
(Bertram G. Ramcharan ed., 1979); Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the 
Charter, 12 TEX. INT’L L.J. 129, 133 (1977). 
68  Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.32/41 (May 13, 1968), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/l2ptichr.htm. 
69  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 66, art. 23.  
70  Id. art. 24.  
71  Id. art. 25. 
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dignity.72 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, commits its parties 
to protecting individuals’ civil and political rights, including rights 
to life,73 freedom of religion,74 expression,75 and assembly.76  It also 
includes the right to privacy,77 freedom from discrimination78 and 
freedom from involuntary servitude or forced labor.79  The ICCPR 
has 167 parties, including the U.S.80 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996, 
commits its parties to endeavor to provide their residents with 
positive economic, social, and cultural rights, including education, 
health, and an adequate standard of living, which includes food, 
clothing, and housing.81  The ICESCR has 160 parties.82  The U.S. 
and six other countries have signed but not ratified the ICESCR.  
The ICESCR, in contrast to the ICCPR, does not guarantee the rights 
it declares, but rather promises to achieve “progressive realization” 
of these rights,83 which at the very least includes the obligation not 
to impede realization of these rights.84 
                                                     
72  Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10. 
73  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 66, art. 6.  
74  Id. art. 18.  
75  Id. art. 19.  
76  Id. art. 21.  
77  ICCPR, supra note 62.  The U.S. signed the ICCPR in 1977 and ratified it in 
1992.  Id. 
78  Id. art. 26. 
79  Id. art. 8, § 2. 
80  ICCPR, supra note 62.  The U.S. signed the ICCPR in 1977 and ratified it in 
1992. 
81  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
82  Id.  
83  Id. art. 2.1 (parties are obliged to “take steps . . . to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”). 
84  U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., General Comment 3: 
The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990), ¶ 9 
[hereinafter UN Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.], available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symb
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3.1.2. The United Nations and Human Rights Violations 
United Nations bodies are responsible for addressing violations 
of the ICCPR and ICESCR. All parties to the ICCPR submit to 
monitoring by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.85  
Redress for human rights violations under the ICCPR is available 
only pursuant to the First Optional Protocol.86  The First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR permits individuals to complain directly to 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee about violations of rights 
provided for in the ICCPR.  A total of 114 nations are party to the 
Optional Protocol – the U.S. is not one of them.87 
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
recognizes that immediate guarantee of each of the rights 
enshrined in the ICESCR may not be feasible; parties nevertheless 
must “take steps” toward realizing the rights, and must provide 
“minimum essential levels” of each of the rights.88  Pursuant to the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights can consider complaints from 
individuals, but only those individuals from the ten countries who 
have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.89   
 
3.2. Human Rights and Regional International Bodies 
 
In addition to the human rights enshrined in the United Nation 
instruments, several regional international bodies have made 
human rights commitments.  The Organization of American States 
(OAS), members of the European Union, and members of the 
African Union each have accepted human rights obligations.  
 
                                                     
olno=INT%2fCESCR%2fGEC%2f4758&Lang=en (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) 
(“[D]eliberately retrogressive” measures are prohibited). 
85 ICCPR, supra note 62.  
86  OHCHR Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 63. 
87  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&lang=en.  
88  UN Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 84, ¶¶ 8–9. 
89  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 87.  The International Labor Organization also forms part of the 
United Nations and addressed concerns pertaining to workers’ rights.   
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3.2.1. The Inter-American System 
 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(American Declaration) applies to members of the Organization of 
American States (OAS).90  The American Declaration was signed in 
1948, and includes civil and political rights as well as economic, 
social and cultural rights, including property, work, leisure, and 
social security.91  The rights can be limited by the “just demands of 
the general welfare and the advancement of democracy.”92  The 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted in 
1969 – by some members of the OAS, excluding the United States – 
and enshrines in more detail civil and political rights including the 
right to humane treatment,93 freedom from slavery,94 right to 
liberty,95 right to privacy,96 and the right to property.97  Parties also 
agree to “adopt measures . . . with a view to achieving 
progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full 
realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, 
educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the 
Charter of the Organization of American States . . . .”98  The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights provides 
                                                     
90  The following 21 nations initially signed the OAS Charter in 1948: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The 
following 14 nations joined subsequently: Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago (1967); 
Jamaica (1969); Grenada (1975); Suriname (1977); Dominica (Commonwealth of), 
Saint Lucia (1979); Antigua, Barbuda, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines (1981); 
the Bahamas (Commonwealth of) (1982); St. Kitts and Nevis (1984); Canada 
(1990); Belize and Guyana (1991).  Who We Are, ORG. OF AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/about/member_states.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
91  Org. of Am. States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
May 2, 1948, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, art. 1-28, at 17 [hereinafter 
American Declaration], available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.american%20Declaration.htm.  
92  Id. art. 28. 
93  Org. of Am. States, American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San 
Jose, Costa Rica,” art. 5, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm  (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) 
[hereinafter American Convention]. 
94  Id. art. 6. 
95  Id. art. 7. 
96  Id. art. 11. 
97  Id. art. 21. 
98  Id. art. 26. 
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recommendations in response to petitions alleging human rights 
abuses by an OAS member.  Petitions are typically limited to 
widespread human rights violations.99 
 
3.2.2. The European System 
 
All Council of Europe member states are bound by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).100   The ECHR 
protects civil and political rights101 such as life,102 liberty,103 fair 
trial,104 and privacy,105 freedom from servitude,106 and freedom 
from discrimination.107  The ECHR also provides for a right to 
property108 and a right to education.109  The European Court of 
Human Rights is responsible for adjudicating alleged violations of 
the ECHR, and individuals, organizations, or contracting nations 
(on behalf of their citizens) may bring claims to the European 
                                                     
99  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, The Inter-American Human 
Rights System, HUM. RTS. EDUC. ASSOCS.,  www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=413 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
100  The member states include: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ‘The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia,’ Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.  See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states (last visited Jan. 24, 
2014). 
101  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 1-18, Sept. 3, 1953, E.T.S. 5, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited Jan. 
24, 2014). 
102  Id. art. 2. 
103  Id. art. 5. 
104  Id. art. 6. 
105  Id. art. 8. 
106  Id. art. 4. 
107  Id. art. 14. 
108  Id. at Protocol 1, art. 1. 
109  Id. at Protocol 1, art. 2; see also Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Eur., 
Resolution 1031 (1994) on the Honoring of Commitments Entered into by Member States 
When Joining the Council of Europe (1994), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta94/ERES1
031.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
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Court of Human Rights.110 
 
3.2.3. The African System 
 
All members of the African Union except South Sudan have 
ratified and are bound by the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR).111  The ACHPR includes the rights such 
as freedom from discrimination,112 life,113 dignity,114 freedom from 
slavery,115 rights to due process concerning arrest and detention,116 
the right to a fair trial,117 freedom of expression,118 and the right to 
property.119  The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights has the responsibility of overseeing and interpreting the 
ACHPR.120  
 
3.3. Domestic Legislation 
 
Several nations, including South Africa,121 India,122 Belgium, 
                                                     
110  EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., PRACTICAL GUIDE ON 
ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA (2011), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2014).  
111 State Reporting, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 
http://www.achpr.org/states/ (listing states that have ratified the ACHPR). 
112  African Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., African (Banjul) Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 18, Oct. 21, 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
5, 21 I.L.M. 58, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2014). 
113  Id. art. 4. 
114  Id. art. 5. 
115  Id. art. 5.  
116  Id. art. 6.  
117  Id. art. 7; see also art. 25 (outlining the State parties’ duty to promote the 
rights and freedoms contained in the Charter, to educate their constituencies 
about them, and ensure they are understood). 
118  Id. art. 9. 
119  Id. art. 14.  
120  Submission of State Reports, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., 
http://www.achpr.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
121  CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., Dec. 18, 1996, ch. 2. 
122  THE CONST. OF INDIA, Nov. 26, 1949, art. 300A. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/4
ONDERSMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:32 PM 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR DEBT RELIEF 295 
Germany,123 Spain,124 Colombia,125 and Brazil,126 have explicitly 
incorporated human rights principles into their constitutions.127 
For example, Belgium’s constitution requires that its citizens be 
able to “lead a life in conformity with human dignity.”128  Other 
nations have given international human rights instruments the 
force of domestic law.  For instance, the U.K. passed the Human 
Rights Act of 1998, which adopts the European Convention on 
Human Rights as domestic legislation and provides an 
enforcement mechanism for it.129  In some nations, legislation or 
case law may provide for domestic law to permit causes of action 
for human rights treaty obligations.130  Again, even nations that do 
not refer explicitly to human rights in their constitution in fact 
protect human rights; for example, by prohibiting discrimination 
or protecting privacy rights or rights to due process.131 
 
4. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN                                                  
ADDRESSING OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 
 
The previous Part provided a brief overview of the instruments 
                                                     
123  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I (Ger.). 
124  C.E., B.O.E. n. 47, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
125  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 11–26. 
126  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (Braz.). 
127  Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 50 VA. J. 
INT’L. L. 985, 986 (2009) (describing the “postwar paradigm” of constitutional law 
as one that “implements national commitments to the protection of basic human 
rights through proportionality tests licensed by explicit (or sometimes implicit) 
limitations clauses.”).  See, e.g., David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence 
of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV 762, 833-47 (2012) (discussing the 
influence of human rights instruments on constitutions). 
128  1994 CONST. art. 23 (Belg.).  
129  Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42, NAT’L ARCHIVES, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents (last visited Jan. 24, 
2014). 
130  See Penny Venetis, Making Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the 
United States: The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 98, 136 
(explaining that some U.S. courts have found that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects rights 
secured by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), although most 
courts have held that § 1983 does not provide actionable individual rights or 
propose legislation to implement human rights treaties). 
131  See, e.g., Law & Versteeg, supra note 127, at 774 (providing a table 
discussing the number of countries that provide for various rights).  
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that establish human rights obligations and described some of the 
international bodies responsible for enforcing these obligations.  
This Part explores in detail those protected human rights that can 
inform responses to over-indebtedness.  For nations that are 
considering how to address issues of over-indebtedness and that 
have either undertaken human rights obligations or wish to adhere 
to human rights standards, this Part can serve as a guide. 
Because my expertise is in the area of U.S. insolvency law, I 
devote much of my analysis to considering how a human rights 
approach might affect policy choices in the U.S.  Although the U.S. 
has not signed on to the International Covenant of Social, 
Economic, and Cultural Rights, we have signed on to the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. In addition, 
there are a number of policy makers who agree with the human 
rights standards enshrined in the ICCPR and who might like to 
ensure that the U.S.’s response to over-indebtedness is consistent 
with these principles.  What is notable is that the current system for 
responding to over-indebtedness, while considered by many to be 
the most liberal response to over-indebtedness, in fact fails to 
satisfy human rights standards.  This does not mean that the 
insolvency regime is to blame for the weakness in satisfying 
human rights principles; rather, the weak U.S. social safety net and 
gaps in consumer protection leave a hefty role for the consumer 
bankruptcy system.  However, as I will discuss, there are some 
aspects of the bankruptcy system itself that do raise human rights 
concerns.  While I do not here argue that policymakers should 
necessarily craft a response to over-indebtedness that is consistent 
with human rights principles, I demonstrate that the current 
system does accomplish this.  In other words, our current 
frameworks and policy goals have left us with significant gaps 
from a human rights lens. 
Although much of my discussion is U.S.-focused, I do include 
some examples from other nations to demonstrate that these issues 
are not unique to the U.S.  However, there is not room here for a 
discussion of each nation’s laws addressing consumer over-
indebtedness.  Nevertheless, policymakers and lawmakers can 
evaluate their responses to consumer over-indebtedness using this 
analysis. 
 
4.1. Adequate Standard of Living 
 
The ICESCR recognizes the right to “an adequate standard of 
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living” for the individual and his or her family, including 
“adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.”132  While the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights does not have enforcement 
capacity, it has issued comments concluding that nation states as 
well as the private business sector have obligations to ensure 
adequate living standards.133  Economic, social, and cultural rights 
are only minimally addressed in the ACHR and ECHR.  ACHR 
signatories commit to the progressive realization “of the rights 
implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural 
standards” set forth in the Charter.134  The ECHR, in its additional 
protocols, provides for the right to education but no other 
substantive positive right.135 
Over-indebtedness may interfere with rights to adequate food 
and housing because individuals may not have enough money left 
over after paying creditors in order to provide for these needs.  As 
a result, some individuals may be so over-indebted that they 
cannot meet their basic needs or the basic needs of their 
dependents.  They may be trapped in a cycle of ever-increasing 
debt obligations as fees and interest mount, leaving less and less 
disposable income to satisfy fundamental needs.  They may be 
forced to turn over virtually all of the fruits of their labor to 
creditors indefinitely.  Children of over-indebted individuals may 
also lack access to food or housing.136  Elder indebted individuals 
                                                     
132  ICESCR, supra note 81, art. 11, § 1.  
133  UN Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 84, at General 
Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food, art. 11, ¶ 20; General Comment 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, art. 12, ¶ 42. 
134  American Convention, supra note 93, art. 42. 
135  Council of Eur., Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 2, Mar. 20, 
1952 [hereinafter First Protocol], available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm (last visited Jan. 
25, 2014).  
136  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 26–27.   
Over-indebtedness may result in exclusion of individuals and 
families from society, including a loss of motivation to be engaged 
in income-generating activities, exclusion from social activities, and 
health problems. This is not only detrimental to the individuals and 
families concerned, but also to society as a whole as it suffers 
evident financial loss.  That is why one of the paramount objectives 
of rehabilitation should be social and financial inclusion of over-
indebted individuals and families. 
 Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10, at 17. 
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may be particularly at risk of being unable to meet their basic 
needs because their ability to accumulate new income is limited. 
Aggressive debt collection can interfere with debtors’ rights to 
adequate food and housing, although “most societies have decided 
that debtors cannot be left with no assets whatsoever with which to 
support themselves and their families.”137  Nations often limit 
creditors’ remedies by enacting exemption laws that protect 
debtors’ basic needs; for example, basic household goods, 
protection from excessive wage garnishment, and protection of the 
debtor’s home.  However, exemption levels vary widely from one 
jurisdiction to the next. 
In the United States, although the Federal Consumer Credit 
Protection Act provides that no more than twenty-five percent of 
consumer wages may be garnished,138 exemption levels vary 
tremendously from state to state.  Some jurisdictions require 
debtors to live at “close to poverty levels,” permitting debtors to 
retain only tools of the trade, wearing apparel, and bedding, and 
only up to a limited value.139  Other jurisdictions allow creditors to 
garnish much of debtors’ wages, meaning that the debtor is unable 
to retain sufficient income to maintain a standard of living that is 
consistent with human dignity.  Absent an opportunity for debt 
relief, debtors could be “confine[d] to a distressed state 
indefinitely.”140  In many jurisdictions, even where the debtor is 
entitled to some exemptions, “any future excess property or 
earnings beyond the exemption limits remain available to 
creditors, often indefinitely.”141  In forty-one states in the United 
States, exemption laws do not protect a living wage, and twenty 
states permit such extensive garnishment that an individual who 
earns minimum wage is left with wages that fall below the poverty 
line, and a family of four making minimum wage can be left with 
less than half of the federal poverty guideline.142  In such situations, 
creditors will reap the benefits of debtors’ labor rather than the 
debtor and his/her family. 
                                                     
137  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 76. 
138  15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.; 29 CFR § 870. 
139  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 78. 
140  Id. at 71.   
141  Id. at 76. 
142  Carolyn Carter & Robert Hobbs, No Fresh Start: How States Let Debt 
Collectors Push Families into Poverty, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (Oct. 2013), available 
at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-no-fresh-start.pdf. 
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There is also tremendous variation among states with respect 
to which assets debtors can retain.  Some states do not leave 
debtors with even basic household goods.  Pennsylvania, for 
example, protects only clothing, Bibles, schoolbooks, sewing 
machines, military uniforms, and $300 worth of other property – 
an amount grossly insufficient for preserving furniture and 
appliances.143  Likewise, Vermont exempts only one cow, two 
goats, three swarms of bees, and one vehicle worth $2500 or less.144 
Other jurisdictions permit full exemptions for certain categories 
of assets, including the debtor’s home, household goods, tools of 
the trade, health aids, and in some cases unmatured life insurance 
or retirement.145  Those unable to work may need additional 
protection – exempting debtor’s pensions and retirement assets 
from collection would help protect an adequate standard of living 
for the elderly.  In some countries, unvested pension trusts are 
protected whereas contractual agreements or retirement savings 
are not.146 
If exemption laws and social safety nets are insufficient to 
protect debtors’ rights to an adequate standard of living, a debt 
relief regime may be one method of restoring individuals’ basic 
needs.  In the United States, federal bankruptcy exemptions 
mitigate the effect of some states’ meager exemption laws, but only 
in those states that permit debtors to “opt-out” of the state 
exemption laws in bankruptcy.147 
Where reducing the cost of servicing debt allows debtors to 
meet their basic needs, an insolvency regime may be an effective 
way of satisfying the human rights compliant standard of living.  
In many cases, of course, an individual’s inability to meet basic 
needs is a combination of insufficient income and over-
indebtedness.  Income shortfall may lead to a need to access credit 
which exacerbates the income shortfall as the individual must 
devote increasing income to servicing the debt, often including 
mounting interest and fees.  In some cases, income is sufficient so 
that debt relief alone will enable the debtor to meet his or her basic 
needs, while in many other cases the problem is the broader 
problem of poverty.  Although insolvency systems may contribute 
                                                     
143  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8124 (West 2013). 
144  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (2013). 
145  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 77–78. 
146  Id. at 82–83. 
147   11 U.S.C. § 522.  
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to ameliorating adequate living concerns, there are limits to what 
insolvency regimes can accomplish.  Relieving individuals from 
debt will only help if the cause of the inadequate living standard is 
indebtedness.  There are many impoverished individuals who are 
not indebted, so debt relief will not be an exclusive solution to the 
challenge of meeting the basic needs of individuals.  However, in 
countries where over-indebtedness creates or exacerbates 
situations of poverty, a debt relief regime can be a helpful tool. 
If a nation chooses an insolvency regime as a method of 
protecting the basic needs of debtors, the insolvency regime itself 
will also need to permit the debtor to retain sufficient assets to 
satisfy this human rights concern.  The exemption levels required 
in order to protect the debtor’s human rights to basic subsistence 
depends upon whether the jurisdiction provides for some minimal 
level of support adequate to satisfy such requirements.  Debtors 
should retain “sufficient property to meet post-insolvency 
minimum domestic needs for themselves and their families and, 
where necessary, minimum business needs.”148  If exemption laws 
sufficiently protect debtors’ wages, housing, and other essentials, 
and/or if the state guarantees adequate housing and basic needs 
apart from exemption laws, debt relief may not be necessary to 
satisfy this particular right; however, it is certainly likely to be one 
component of addressing such concerns, particularly for those 
nations that are averse to robust, taxpayer-funded social safety 
nets.  Alternatively, or additionally, nations may provide a robust 
safety net for individuals with income shortfalls and may not need 
to rely as heavily on an insolvency regime.  Nations that provide 
generous support to elders may not be as concerned about debt 
relief for elders.  If food and housing consistent with human 
dignity is available, debt relief may be somewhat less important. 
However, even if nations provide a robust welfare system that 
ensures an adequate standard of living for its residents, the state of 
perpetual indebtedness and an inability to be self-sufficient may 
infringe on human dignity, as discussed subsequently.  Because the 
United States has elected to provide a relatively weak social safety 
net, it may need to rely disproportionately on debt relief to 
ameliorate the income shortfalls and attendant food and housing 
concerns.  Providing an opportunity to discharge debt relatively 
quickly can partially offset, in some cases, the government’s 
                                                     
148  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 76. 
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decision to devote relatively fewer resources to housing.  In 
addition, careful exemption laws, such as restricting garnishment 
of low-income individuals, is more critical in cases where the 
government is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient support to 
meet basic needs. 
 
4.2. Right to Healthcare 
 
The ICESCR also provides for the right to the “highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”149  Over-
indebtedness impacts access to healthcare in two ways:  it 
decreases the funds available to pay for health care and also can be 
the cause of health problems.  Indeed, health expenses are one of 
the key causes of over-indebtedness in some countries, particularly 
in the United States.150 
The health problems that have been linked to over-
indebtedness include both psychological and physical trauma.  
Studies have consistently found evidence that debt burdens can 
lead to anxiety, depression, and social withdrawal.  Suffering from 
debt loads can even lead to physical illness, including sleep 
deprivation, lack of concentration, indigestion, heart problems, 
nerve problems, and even suicide.151  Debt relief regimes may 
ameliorate the psychological trauma caused by over-indebtedness 
– relief from debt obligations has been shown to relieve anxiety 
                                                     
149 ICESCR, supra note 81, art. 12. 
150  David Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffie 
Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National 
Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 743, 743–44 (2009). 
151  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 25–27 (citing Laura Choi, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Financial Stress and Its Physical Effects on Individuals 
and Communities, 5 CMTY. DEV. INV. REV. 120 (2009); AP-AOL/ABT SRBI, Credit 
Card / Debt Stress Study (2008), available at http://surveys.ap.org/data/SRBI/AP-
AOL%20Health%20Poll%20Topline%20040808_FINAL_debt%20stress.pdf; Nigel 
Balmer, Pascoe Pleasence, et al., Worried Sick: The Experience of Debt Problems and 
Their Relationship with Health, Illness and Disability, 5 SOC. POL’Y & SOC’Y 39 (2006)); 
Burcu Duygan-Bump & Charles Grant, Household Debt Repayment Behaviour: What 
Role Do Institutions Play?, 24 ECON. POL’Y 107 (2009); Sarah Emami, World Health 
Org., Consumer Over-Indebtedness and Health Care Costs: How to Approach the 
Question from a Global Perspective, Background Paper 3, World Health Report 
(2010); Fr. Bang Olsen, Social-retspleje, ADVOKATBLADET, nr. 1 (1972); see also 
Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS, 560-71 (2002). 
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and other stress reactions to over-indebtedness.152  In one study of 
over 1,300 debtors in New York, Chicago, Detroit, and 
Philadelphia, nearly half of debtors reported health problems.153  
Another study of 970 individuals in Ohio found that a high debt to 
income ratio was significantly associated with poor physical 
health.154  Other studies have found over-indebtedness to be 
associated with higher incidences of periodontal disease155 and 
even melanoma.156  Even worse, debtors who faced significant 
creditor collection harassment were far more likely to report health 
problems than debtors who were not targeted aggressively.157 
Of course, the ability of debt relief to ameliorate stress-induced 
health problems will work only if debt is the primary source of 
stress – if job loss, family break-up, or general financial instability 
is also a primary cause of the stress, these matters will also have to 
be addressed. 
Not only can debt lead to health problems, but over-indebted 
individuals also may lack sufficient resources to pay for health 
insurance and/or health treatment, including preventative care 
and emergency care.  Some individuals may be unable to satisfy 
their basic living needs or pay for future healthcare specifically as a 
result of excessive medical debt.  If individuals lack access to 
affordable health insurance or affordable medical care, it is 
possible that some of them may not seek treatment absent an 
ability to ultimately escape debt burdens incurred; or these 
individuals may have to choose among meeting their need for 
food, housing, or proper medical care.  Nations that provide their 
citizens with free high quality healthcare will not face this problem.  
Although over-indebtedness may raise other concerns, over-
indebtedness will not prevent access to healthcare.  In contrast, in 
                                                     
152  See, e.g., Götz Lechner & Wolfram Backert, Menschen in der Verbraucher-
insolvenz: Rechtliche und soziale Wirksamkeit des Verbraucherinsolvenzverfahrens 
einschließlich Darstellung der Haushaltsstrukturdaten des untersuchten Personen-kreises, 
in BMFSFJ, MATERIALIEN ZUR FAMILIENPOLITIK: LEBENSLAGEN VON FAMILIEN UND 
KINDERN: ÜBERSCHULDUNG PRIVATER HAUSHALTE 33–54 (2008). 
153  DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN 
DEFAULT 8 (1974). 
154  Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the Limit: The Association Among 
Health, Race and Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517, 518 (2000). 
155  R.J. Genco et. al., Relationship of Stress, Distress and Inadequate Coping 
Behaviours to Periodontal Disease, 70 J. PERIODONTOLOGY 711, 711-23 (1999). 
156  R.J. Havlik, A.P. Vukasin & S. Ariyan, The Impact of Stress on the Clinical 
Presentation of Melanoma, 90 PLASTIC & RECONSTR. SURGERY 57, 57–61 (1992). 
157  CAPLOVITZ, supra note 153, at 288. 
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countries without affordable healthcare, such as the United States, 
debt relief may be a crucial part of meeting the right to healthcare.  
If health costs can be incurred on credit and discharged in 
bankruptcy, individuals may be able to have sufficient access to 
healthcare even when income is insufficient.  In such a situation 
the cost of debt relief would be initially born by the medical 
creditor (the healthcare provider), but costs could be ultimately 
passed on to non-defaulting recipients of medical care.  The system 
thus functions as a form of insurance, albeit an inefficient one.  
The intersection between nations’ health care systems and 
insolvency regimes is particularly important in light of the causal 
link between medical debt and over-indebtedness.158  In the United 
States, for example, over half of consumer bankruptcies can be 
attributed in part to medical costs.159  Indeed, empirical evidence 
suggests that increased health coverage is linked to a decrease in 
problems associated with over-indebtedness; a study by the 
Chicago Federal Reserve demonstrated Massachusetts’ universal 
health care legislation was associated with a decrease in debt, third 
party debt collection actions, and bankruptcies.160 
Thus, lack of a robust health care system can be the cause of 
over-indebtedness, which in turn can cause health problems, and 
which also can lead to a decreased ability to pay for health care.  A 
policy decision to let an insolvency regime do much of the work 
for protecting rights to healthcare is not only inefficient but is also 
unlikely to be a complete solution from a human rights 
perspective.  Debt relief can provide some relief for individuals 
suffering health problems due to over-indebtedness or suffering 
health problems that will cause over-indebtedness, but medical 
treatment will still be necessary. 
 
4.3. Right to Work and “Favorable” Remuneration 
 
Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
                                                     
158  Himmelstein et al., supra note 150, at 743-44 (providing empirical 
evidence of the link between medical expenses and the need for debt relief).  
159  Id. 
160  Bhashkar Mazumder & Sarah Miller, The Effects of the Massachusetts Health 
Reform on Financial Distress, FED. RES. BANK CHI. (2014), available at 
http://chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/working_papers/2014/wp_01.cf
m. 
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provides that “everyone has the right to work” and that workers 
have “the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.”161 
The International Labor Organization is also responsible for 
monitoring and protecting rights to work.162  The Right to Work is 
one of the human rights explicitly mentioned in international 
insolvency work; the World Bank Report expressly concludes that 
nations’ choice of treatment of over-indebtedness implicates the 
rights to work and fair pay.163  The Report does not elaborate as to 
how specifically the right to work might be implicated, but there 
are at least two ways that indebted individuals’ rights to work and 
receive fair remuneration could be imperiled due to over-
indebtedness.  First, debt collection laws may permit excessive 
wage garnishment, leaving the individual with insufficient 
remuneration to meet basic needs.  In addition, because the 
primary benefit of labor will inure to creditors rather than to the 
worker, excessive garnishment may deter employment. 
Second, not only can collection laws leave the debtor with 
insufficient remuneration, but collection laws may also permit 
employers to terminate individuals whose wages are garnished, 
thus interfering with the right to work.164  In the United States, for 
example, although employers may not discriminate against 
employees who have a single garnishment order against them, 
employers may discriminate against (whether by terminating or 
failing to hire) individuals with more than one garnishment order 
against them.165  In addition, in some places employers are 
permitted to fire or fail to hire individuals based on their credit 
scores.166  In other words, individuals who are excessively 
                                                     
161  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 66, art. 23, §§ 1, 3. 
162  See Applying and Promoting International Labour Standards, INT’L LABOR 
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-
international-labour-standards/lang—en/index.htm (providing a description of 
the supervisory structure and functions of the ILO in supervising the application 
of labor standards). 
163  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 50. 
164  Termination on such grounds also violates anti-discrimination principles. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (2012). 
165  See id. (employers may not terminate employees for “any one” 
garnishment order – there is no prohibition on termination if an employee is 
subject to multiple garnishment orders). 
166  Gary Rivlin, The Long Shadow of Bad Credit in a Job Search, N.Y. TIMES (May 
11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/business/employers-pull-
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financially distressed are most at risk of termination. 
If collection laws interfere with the debtors’ right to work or 
receive just pay, an accessible debt relief regime providing an 
opportunity for relief from such collection methods may protect 
these rights.  For example, a bankruptcy filing could trigger an 
automatic stay ceasing collection activities including 
garnishment.167  Bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings could also 
provide an opportunity for the discharge or reorganization of debt 
so that the debtor can retain sufficient income.  Halting 
garnishment and providing an opportunity to discharge or 
reorganize the debt upon which the garnishment orders are based 
would also prevent barriers to employment.  Of course, the 
insolvency regime would also have to protect against interference 
with the right to work; for example, employers should not be 
permitted to fire or fail to hire individuals solely because of a 
bankruptcy filing.168 
An insolvency regime is not the only way to address these 
concerns, however; restrictions on garnishment or restrictions on 
firing due to garnishment or other debt-related issues would also 
prevent interference with the rights to work and receive just 
remuneration for labor.  Whether an insolvency regime is required 
to protect the rights to work and receive just remuneration 
depends on the jurisdiction’s background rules including 
limitations on debt collection and restrictions on termination of 
over-indebted individuals. 
 
4.4. Prohibition on Incarceration for Failure to Pay Debt 
 
In some jurisdictions, failure to pay debt can result in the 
debtor being deprived of liberty, a condition that violates human 
rights standards and obligations.  In some states in the United 
States, for example, debtors may be imprisoned for contempt of 
                                                     
applicants-credit-reports.html.  A new bill proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren 
would prohibit employers from conducting credit checks on prospective 
employees.  Noah Bierman, Proposal Would Ban Employers from Looking at Credit 
History, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/12/17/elizabeth-warren-
measure-would-forbid-employers-from-looking-job-applicant-credit-
history/mRgMmewBKxTI9i71wsMJXP/story.html. 
167  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (discussing automatic stays in bankruptcy). 
168  11 U.S.C. § 525.  
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court orders to pay creditors.  A number of human rights 
instruments prohibit imprisonment for failure to pay a debt.  Both 
the ICCPR and the ECHR provide that “[n]o one shall be 
imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation.”169  The ACHR provides that “[n]o one shall be 
detained for debt,170 but permits detention if ordered by a 
“competent judicial authority for the nonfulfillment of duties of 
support.”171 
Although “debtor’s prisons” as such have been abolished, in 
the United States, a full third of states indirectly permit 
incarceration for failure to pay debt, including medical debt, credit 
card debt, and automobile loans.172  Failure to pay debt does not 
automatically lead to incarceration, but debtors can be arrested for 
contempt of court orders that require them to appear or pay legal 
fines in connection with collection proceedings.173  In advocating 
for legislation prohibiting incarceration in connection with creditor 
actions, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan objected that many 
residents “have been thrown in jail simply because they’re too poor 
to pay their debts.”174  Liberty deprivation triggered by a default on 
debt is inconsistent with human rights principles.  Although 
international human rights law may not prohibit incarceration of 
individuals who are able but unwilling to pay debts, many of those 
incarcerated for contempt of court orders to pay have 
demonstrated an inability to pay.175 
In addition to incarceration related to creditor actions, 
individuals can be incarcerated for failure to pay legal debts in a 
number of states.176  For example, one woman was incarcerated 
four times because she did not pay $251 in court costs and fines 
                                                     
169 ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 11.  The European Convention on Human 
Rights did not initially include a prohibition on detention or imprisonment on 
account of default, but Article 1 of the 1963 Protocol prohibits deprivation of 
liberty “merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation.” 
Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 1 
[hereinafter The European Convention on Human Rights], available at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
170  American Convention, supra note 93, art. 7, § 7. 
171  Id. 
172  Alain Sherter, Jailed for $280: The Return of Debtors’ Prisons, AXIS OF LOGIC 
(Apr. 28, 2012), http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_64490.shtml. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
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related to her fourth-degree misdemeanor case.177  The American 
Civil Liberties Union stated:  
 
The sad truth is that debtors’ prisons are flourishing 
today, more than two decades after the Supreme Court 
prohibited imprisoning those who are too poor to pay 
their legal debts.  In this era of shrinking budgets, state 
and local governments have turned aggressively to 
using the threat and reality of imprisonment to squeeze 
revenue out of the poorest defendants who appear in 
their courts.178 
 
In some cases court systems add a collection fee to the original 
fine or refer collection of legal fees to collection agencies entitled to 
add collection fees.179  The collection fees can be as high as thirty or 
forty percent of the original debt.180  Very minor infractions – such 
as speeding – can lead to fines and incarceration.  For example, one 
Alabama woman initially received a $179 speeding ticket, but after 
missing the court date fees mounted to over $1500.  She was then 
jailed and her case turned over to a probation company, which 
resulted in even greater fees (ultimately totaling over $3,000) and 
further instances of incarceration as a result of her failure to pay.181 
Although imprisonment for failure to pay legal fees may not be, in 
the first instance, punishment due to inability to pay a debt, 
imprisonment due to inability to pay a legal fine violates the 
prohibition whether the imprisonment is considered “punishment” 
or not. 
Incarceration has a number of other deleterious consequences 
                                                     
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179 Id.  Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for 
Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012),   
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-as-
companies-profit.html?smid=pl-share.  
180  Sherter, supra note 172.   
Some states also apply ‘poverty penalties,’ including late fees, 
payment plan fees, and interest when people are unable to pay all 
their debts at once, according to a report by the New York 
University’s Brennan Center for Justice.  Alabama charges a 30 
percent collection fee, for instance, while Florida allows private 
debt collectors to add a 40 percent surcharge on the original debt. 
Id. 
181  Bronner, supra note 3. 
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that imperil debtors’ human rights – it interferes with the debtors’ 
ability to maintain employment and housing, in addition to 
preventing the debtor from meeting the basic subsistence needs of 
himself and his dependents.182 
Of course, the simplest and surest solution to this human rights 
infraction would be to ban any incarceration resulting from failure 
to pay a debt.  Indeed, a debt relief regime is likely insufficient to 
remedy this human rights violation—any such incarceration for 
failure to pay debt is inconsistent with human rights principles.  As 
an interim matter, debt relief regimes can provide an escape from 
state law in situations in which incarceration raises human rights 
concerns.  For debtors unable to pay support debts, debt relief 
regimes may be one solution for ensuring payment of support 
debts; in some cases it may only be possible for debtors to pay 
support obligations if other consumer debt obligations are relieved. 
 
4.5. Prohibition on Debt Peonage 
 
Under certain circumstances, debt servicing may give rise to a 
condition similar to peonage, which would interfere with the 
debtors’ right to be free from servitude.  The ICCPR, ECHR, and 
ACHR all prohibit slavery, servitude, and “forced or compulsory 
labor.”183  The ACHPR does not prohibit forced labor.  Debt 
                                                     
182  Sherter, supra note 172.  
Many states are imposing new and often onerous ‘user fees’ on 
individuals with criminal convictions,’ the authors of the Brennan Center 
report wrote.  ‘Yet far from being easy money, these fees impose 
severe—and often hidden—costs on communities, taxpayers, and 
indigent people convicted of crimes.  They create new paths to prison for 
those unable to pay their debts and make it harder to find employment 
and housing as well to meet child-support obligations.   
Id. 
183  Article 8, § 2 and § 3 of the ICCPR prohibits slavery and servitude “in all 
their forms,” as well as “forced or compulsory labor.”  ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 8, 
§§ 2, 3.  Article 4 of Section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
prohibits slavery, servitude, and “forced or compulsory labor.”  Id. art. 4, § 1.  
Work compelled in the course of detention, emergency, military, or “civic 
obligations” is not considered forced or compulsory.  Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 101, art. 4, § 1.  The 
American Convention on Human Rights prohibits slavery and involuntary 
servitude “in all their forms” and also prohibits “forced or compulsory labor.”  
American Convention, supra note 93, art. 6, §§ 1, 2.  Labor in the course of criminal 
punishment, military service, “danger and calamity,” or civic obligation is not 
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bondage is also prohibited in the Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery.184  Debt bondage is defined as: 
 
the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of 
his personal services or of those of a person under his 
control as security for a debt, if the value of those services 
as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those 
services are not respectively limited and defined.185   
 
Peonage refers to the practice of requiring an individual to work to 
pay off a creditor as a condition of default, often providing for 
imprisonment in the alternative.186  Peonage is not equivalent to 
slavery or even involuntary servitude; peons, in contrast to slaves 
and indentured servants, had freedom of movement and full rights 
of citizenship, including the right to vote.187  In cases where the 
issue of forced or compulsory labor has actually been adjudicated, 
the definition of forced labor is quite narrow.  Under the European 
Convention, for example, the Commission held that not only must 
the labor be “exacted . . . under menace of any penalty,” but must 
also be work for which the person “has not offered himself 
voluntarily,” that is, pursuant to a labor contract.188  Under the 
                                                     
forced or compulsory.  Id. art. 6, § 3. 
184  United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Apr. 30, 1957, 
266 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/f3scas.htm. 
185  Id. 
186  Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 190–208 (S. Ct. 1857); Karen Gross, The 
Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 165, 178–79 (1990).  For background information on laws against 
peonage, see generally T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, EMERSON, HABER & 
DORSEN’S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 517–20 (4th ed. 1976); B. 
SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF 
THE PERSON 2 (1968); STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, PART 
I (B. Schwartz ed., 1970); Cyril C. Means, Jr., Surrogacy v. The Thirteenth 
Amendment, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 445 (1987); Robert L. Misner & John H. 
Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
713 (1977); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and 
Race in the Progressive Era—Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982). 
187  Gross, supra note 186, at 177–78. 
188  Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"appno":["73316/01"],"i
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European Convention, labor must be both:  1) against the 
individual’s will, and 2) either the work obligation must be 
“unjust” or “oppressive,” or must be “an avoidable hardship” 
(having some element of harassment).189  However, anti-peonage 
laws were passed pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and violation of anti-peonage laws has thus been 
considered a Thirteenth Amendment violation.190  Individuals can 
work for creditors voluntarily; labor takes the form of peonage 
only if it is coerced with threats of harm or imprisonment.191 
Some scholars have drawn parallels between extended over-
indebtedness and peonage, writing that both conditions “separate 
individuals from the benefits of their own labor.”192  Individuals 
required to devote all future earnings to creditors “would be 
separated from their own labor and subordinated to creditors,” 
and the legislation permitting such condition “would become a 
means of enslaving debtors to their creditors.”193  In fact, U.S. 
lawmakers originally defended bankruptcy discharge specifically 
on the basis that absence of such relief would be akin to a condition 
of bondage.194  
                                                     
temid":["001-69891 (citing Van der Mussele v. Belgium, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1983)).  
189  Iversen v. Norway, Application No. 1468/62, 6 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 
327, 327–29 (1963).  As mentioned above, the International Labour Organization 
has its own jurisprudence on the issue of forced labor.  
190  Gross, supra note 186, at 177; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall 
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”); see also Clyatt v. 
United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905) (holding that Congress has power to pass 
Anti-Peonage laws).   
191  Gross, supra note 186, at 180 n.96 (citing United States v. Kozminski, 821 
F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988)). 
192  Id. 
193  Id. at 165.   
194  Id. at 166 n.8 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1841) 
(statement of Rep. Roosevelt) (‘Talk of slavery and abolition!  What slavery was to 
compare with the bondage of the mind and heart?”); Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 257 (1983) (statement of Lawrence P. King, Prof. of L., N.Y.U. L. Sch.) 
[hereinafter King Statement] (stating that the proposal, “while perhaps not 
technically violative of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution comes very close 
to it in word and in spirit.”); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Future Earnings): 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1981) (statement of Vern Countryman, Prof. of L., Harvard 
Univ. L. Sch.) [hereinafter Countryman Statement] (“We would [be] turn[ing] our 
backs on our history . . . if we were now to enact a mass peonage statute whereby 
the debtor’s discharge is to be delayed for a 5-year period of bondage . . . .”). 
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In order to satisfy human rights standards, debtors cannot be 
forced work to repay creditors.  Rather, debtors must be permitted 
to opt in to such plans or they would likely constitute peonage.195  
Some countries require debtors seeking relief to enter into lengthy 
repayment plans.  For example, in the United States, Chapter 13 
requires certain debtors to repay creditors from their future income 
for a period of three to five years.  Denmark has five-year 
repayment plans,196 and France and Germany have six-year 
repayment plans.197  Debtors in such repayment plans are required 
to work and to devote the fruits of this labor to creditors for an 
extended period. 
Although the lack of access to a prompt discharge alone would 
not be akin to peonage, there are circumstances under which a 
debtor may be deemed “forced” into repayment plans.  For 
example, if the debtor must choose between labor and harm or 
imprisonment, the “choice” of repayment may be a forced one, and 
the relationship thus impermissible. 
In the U.S., for example, there may be circumstances in which 
the debtor is in essence forced to choose between work and 
imprisonment; for example if imprisonment is a consequence for 
unpaid bad checks, failure to pay a tort judgment, or failure to pay 
a domestic support obligation.198  If discharge is unavailable and 
                                                     
195  11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (2012); ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, 
BANKRUPTCY 662–63 (2d ed. 1989); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW 
MANUAL (1986); see Gross, supra note 186, at 167–68 (noting that permitting a 
discharge in bankruptcy only upon working for said benefit may be a 
constitutional violation). 
196  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at 29. 
197  Id. at 44, 45. 
198  Gross, supra note 186, at 176 (describing a hypothetical in which 
proceeding in a chapter 13 repayment case is the only way for a debtor who has 
written a bad check to escape imprisonment and other obligations).  Of course, 
legal realists have long noted that the “choice” not to work is illusory, even for 
non-indebted individuals.  See, e.g., Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470–78 (1923); see also Gross, 
supra note 189, at 181 (“[I]f freedom of chapter choice is eliminated and a debtor 
refusing to work under a Chapter 13 plan forfeits a bankruptcy discharge and 
faces imprisonment under state law, then an unconstitutional condition has been 
placed on discharge.”).   
While the Bankruptcy Code as written may not create a threat of 
imprisonment, the Code as applied—in light of state law—creates such a 
threat.  From the perspective of outcome for the individual debtor, there 
is no meaningful distinction between peonage and bankruptcy.  
Acontextually, then, Chapter 13 may not be offensive; it does not per se 
require a debtor to work.  It is in the context of other aspects of the 
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repayment from future income is the only method for repayment, 
the combined effect of these laws is likely an impermissible 
infringement on the right to be free from coerced labor.  Since 2005, 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code has required the dismissal of a chapter 7 
petition for debtors whose income is above the state median and 
for whom deduction of permitted expenses leaves sufficient 
disposable income to repay a given portion of creditor claims.199  
This makes the “voluntariness” of a chapter 13 filing questionable 
in some cases.200  Individuals ineligible for discharge but who are 
required to repay debt in order to avoid prison are thus coerced 
into laboring for the benefit of creditors.   
Nations do not have to provide for a discharge of debt in order 
to satisfy their human rights obligation to keep individuals free 
from coerced labor.  However, if non-bankruptcy law provides that 
the individual must choose between labor and imprisonment, a 
human rights violation has occurred and can only be remedied by: 
a) the removal of imprisonment as a consequence of nonpayment 
or b) discharge of the debt through some kind of insolvency 
proceeding.201  In other words, debt relief regimes can provide an 
                                                     
Bankruptcy Code and more particularly state law that Chapter 13 must 
be examined. 
Id. at 184 (footnote omitted). 
199  See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) (discussing court power to dismiss a case 
brought under Chapter 13 while providing criteria for evaluating and accounting 
for various forms of monthly expenses and disposable income measures). 
200  JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 196, at 662.  “If a debtor whose Chapter 7 
petition has been dismissed needs protection from creditors, only Chapters 11 and 
13 are available.  In this sense we have, if not an involuntary Chapter 13 for the 
consumer debtor, at least a somewhat coerced one.”  Id. 
201  Imprisonment is permissible as punishment for a crime, but bad check 
actions are actually collection actions in nature rather than punitive.  See Gross, 
supra note 186, at 176 (citing David A. Rice, When Bankruptcy Courts Will Enjoin 
State “Bad Check” Proceedings: The Decline of the Primary Motivation Standard in 
Favor of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 93 COM. L.J. 111 (1988)); P. Steven Kratsch 
& William E. Young, Criminal Prosecutions and Manipulative Restitution: The Use of 
State Criminal Courts for Contravention of Debtor Relief, in 1984 ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 107, 107–09 (1984); James McCafferty & Gary M. Bubis, Criminal 
Restitution and the Bankruptcy Discharge: Should We Reopen Debtors’ Prison?, 10 
CRIM. JUST. J. 27 (1987); see also Gross, supra note 186, at 195: 
The argument can be restated forcefully in the following way. One of the 
roles the anti-peonage laws play is to strike down statutes that provide 
for imprisonment for failing to work.  If, as shown, section 707(b), in 
concert with state criminal law, is used to coerce debtors into Chapter 13, 
then an unconstitutional condition is created.  The offending statutory 
provision, in this instance section 707(b), should be struck down. 
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escape from situations akin from peonage, but they may also end 
up facilitating peonage-like situations in which extended periods 
of labor are required prior to discharge and failure to participate 
places the debtor at risk of incarceration.202 
 
4.6. Discrimination 
 
In redressing over-indebtedness, anti-discrimination principles 
should also be taken into account.  Human rights principles 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of any status, which can 
include the status of indebtedness or the status of bankruptcy 
filing.  Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that all persons are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the 
law “and prohibits discrimination on “any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.”203  Article 1 of the 
ACHR obliges convention parties to “undertake to respect the 
rights and freedoms” specified and to “ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights 
and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition.”204  Article 14 of the ECHR provides that the protected 
rights and freedoms “shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
                                                     
202  Paul Krugman has argued that the 2005 bankruptcy amendments, while 
not creating a condition of peonage, moves closer to creating a condition of 
peonage by eliminating access to prompt discharge for some individuals.  Paul 
Krugman, The Debt-Peonage Society, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/opinion/08krugman.html.  
 
I think the right term is a “debt peonage” society—after the system, 
prevalent in the post-Civil War South, in which debtors were forced to 
work for their creditors.  The bankruptcy bill won’t get us back to those 
bad old days all by itself, but it’s a significant step in that direction. 
Id. 
203  ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 26. 
204  American Convention, supra note 93, art. 1. §§ 1, 2 (explaining that only 
human beings can be “persons”). 
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minority, property, birth, or other status.”205 
No distinction in treatment between two groups is permissible 
without a rational basis and without reasonable proportionality 
between the means employed and object sought.206  Thus, although 
neither debtors nor creditors are protected classes, states may not 
arbitrarily treat similarly situated debtors or creditors differently. 
There are several circumstances in which the situation of over-
indebtedness and responses to over-indebtedness can implicate 
discrimination principles.  If substantive or procedural 
mechanisms are not equivalent for debtors and creditors, this may 
raise a discrimination concern under human rights principles.  For 
example, Ecuador, in an action on behalf of its citizens residing in 
Spain, has alleged that Spain’s foreclosure laws discriminate 
against debtors by arbitrarily limiting the defenses against 
foreclosure available to debtors.207 
There are several instances in the United States involving 
potentially discriminatory situations.  For example, the U.S. 
permits employment discrimination against individuals who are 
subject to multiple garnishment orders.  Furthermore, U.S. 
employers are increasingly conducting credit evaluations of 
prospective employees and may decline to hire someone by virtue 
of their low credit score, bankruptcy filing, or foreclosure record.208  
Finally, creditors may be discriminated against if different classes 
of creditors are treated differently without a rational basis for the 
differential treatment.  For instance, lenders of residential 
properties have greater rights in the U.S. than lenders of 
investment properties because the former cannot be modified in 
bankruptcy while the latter can be reduced to the value of the 
                                                     
205  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 101, art. 14. 
206  Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 6, 2000), available 
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58561 (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2014).  Scholars may view this as more appropriately a due process 
equal protection concern rather than a discrimination concern, but EU human 
rights jurisprudence has primarily dealt with arbitrary differences in treatment as 
a discrimination concern under Article 26 rather than a due process concern, and 
Article 26 defines equal protection to include anti-discrimination.   
207  Petition Before the European Court of Human Rights, Solorzano Verdugo 
v. Spain 29 (January 18, 2012) (copy of petition on file with author). 
208  Gary Rivlin, supra note 167.  A new bill proposed by Senator Elizabeth 
Warren would prohibit employers from conducting credit checks on prospective 
employees.  Bierman, supra note 167.  
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collateral.209  In order for a charge of discrimination to hold up, 
however, the distinction must be shown to be an arbitrary one; 
employers may argue that over-indebted or bankrupt individuals 
are indeed less likely to perform well at work.  Whether this 
distinction is arbitrary requires further investigation. 
Insolvency legislation may be one method of addressing 
discrimination concerns if the status of insolvency filing carries 
with it additional protections from discrimination, such as the 
prohibition of employment discrimination or guarantees of 
equitable treatment in the determination of rights or obligations 
pertaining to credit contracts.  However, a direct prohibition on 
such discrimination may be the most efficient way of 
accomplishing this goal.  An insolvency system may be 
advantageous if there are insufficient enforcement mechanisms for 
anti-discrimination issues outside the insolvency system.  That is, 
although there may be legislative prohibitions on discriminatory 
action, if there is no effective method of redress, the prohibition 
may not be useful.  If insolvency filing gives debtors a protected 
status and a forum for redressing discrimination, this may aid 
nations in respecting anti-discrimination principles. 
It is also important that the response to over-indebtedness itself 
not be discriminatory.  To put it another way, every debtor should 
have equal access to the relief available.  If the regime offers both 
repayment plans and prompt discharge, there should not be any 
arbitrary barrier to accessing discharge, and the debtors’ 
membership in a particular class also should not be a barrier to 
accessing discharge.  The United States bankruptcy system – 
although it is one of the most robust in the world – is not equally 
accessible to all debtors.  Specifically, certain debtors are much 
more likely to enter a chapter 13 repayment plan than a chapter 7 
liquidation plan, although many chapter 13 debtors never obtain 
debt relief, in contrast to chapter 7 debtors who gain an almost 
immediate discharge.210  This discrimination occurs in at least two 
ways:  First, some jurisdictions have traditional local legal practices 
                                                     
209  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012). 
210  Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, 
and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 394–95 (2012); Scott 
F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in 
Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of 
Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer 
Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 (1994).   
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of preferring one chapter over another and steering more clients 
into chapter 13 plans; in effect, debtors face barriers to chapter 7 
arbitrarily, by virtue of the district in which they file.211  Second, 
and more nefariously, empirical research shows that African 
American debtors are far more likely to be steered into a chapter 13 
case than white debtors – even when they expressly state that they 
prefer a chapter 7 filing.212  In addition, debtors who benefit most 
from bankruptcy – those with mostly exemptible property who can 
protect assets such as homes and cars while discharging debt – are 
far more likely to be white.213  Such discriminatory patterns are 
inconsistent with human rights principles. 
 
4.7. Privacy 
 
Privacy is another relevant human rights consideration in the 
debt relief context.  The ACHR, ICCPR, and ECHR all provide for 
freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, home, or 
correspondence.214  The ACHR adds protection from “abusive” 
interference.215  The ACHPR does not protect the right to privacy.  
Under European human rights jurisprudence, the privacy 
protection extends to all lawful residences (including offices, 
campers, and holiday homes), not only homes that the individual 
owns as long as there is a sufficient family connection to the 
dwelling.216  Violations of the right to respect for private life and 
                                                     
211  Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 581 (1993); Chrystin Ondersma, Are Debtors Rational 
Actors? An Experiment, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 296–300 (2009). 
212  Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 211, at 400–15. 
213  A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 MO. L. REV. 
919, 930 (2006); A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1725, 1758–59 (2004). 
214  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 101, art. 8, § 1 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home, and his correspondence.”); ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 17; 
American Convention, supra note 93, art. 11, § 2 (prohibiting “arbitrary or abusive 
interference” with one’s “private life,” home, or correspondence). 
215  American Convention, supra note 93, art. 11, § 2. 
216  Buckley v. United Kingdom, 23 EHRR 101, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 29, 
1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
58076 (1996) (stating that a caravan is a “home” for privacy purposes); Gillow v. 
United Kingdom, 11 EHRR 335, A109 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 24, 1986), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57493 (observing 
that intention to return to a particular contested residence was sufficient to 
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home include searches,217 environmental interference,218 telephone 
tapping,219 and failure to protect personal belongings that formed 
part of the home.220  Interference with privacy interests is justified 
if “necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national 
security, public safety and the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection of 
health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.221  Finally, the right to privacy now includes the “right to 
be forgotten” in internet search materials; bankruptcy filings and 
other adverse credit information cannot be indefinitely 
electronically available.222 
Privacy concerns intersect with debt relief measures in several 
                                                     
establish that it was a “home” even when traveling abroad for many years); 
Mentes v. Turkey, 1997-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 28, 1997), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58120S. 
217  Chappell v. United Kingdom, A152-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 30, 1989), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57459; 
Funke v. France, A256-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb 25, 1993), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57809; Murray v. 
United Kingdom, A300-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 28, 1994), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57895. 
218  Deés v. Hungary, App. No. 2345/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 9, 2010), available 
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101647; López 
Ostra v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R., A303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 9, 1994), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57905; Powell and 
Rayner v. United Kingdom, A172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb 21, 1990), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57622. 
219  Klass v. Germany, A28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 6, 1978), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57510. 
220  Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 22, 2005), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
68373#{"itemid":["001-68373"]}. 
221  The European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 170, art. 8, § 1. 
222  See Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, Mario Costeja González, Case C-131/12, 2014 E.C.R., available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131&from=EN (discussing a 
case involving an individual bringing suit before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for data retention regarding search listings mentioning unpaid 
social security debts, and associated rights to removal of information by operators 
of search engines).  Although the case was a European Court of Justice case rather 
than a human rights case, the decision was based on the privacy rights in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union.  See also Lilian Mitrou & 
Maria Karyda, EU’s Data Protection Reform and the Right to Be Forgotten – A Legal 
Response to a Technological Challenge?, 5th International Conference of Information 
Law and Ethics 2012, at 2, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2165245.  
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respects:  First, debt relief regimes may provide an escape from 
creditor conduct that interferes with privacy infractions.  For 
example, credit reporting and creditor data collection may raise 
privacy concerns.  One way to satisfy this obligation would be to 
prohibit invasive collection practices altogether using consumer 
protection laws such as the U.S. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, both of which incorporate 
privacy measures.223  Alternatively, nations could establish an 
insolvency regime that allows debtors to opt out of such collection 
practices.  Second, any abusive, arbitrary, or improper separation 
of an individual from his or her dwelling implicates privacy 
concerns in addition to the property concerns discussed above.  
Foreclosure may result in the inability of debtors to maintain 
privacy; shelters or other shared living spaces may not provide 
sufficient private space.224  An effective insolvency regime may aid 
in an appropriate resolution of indebtedness that respects the 
debtor’s right to arbitrary interference with their home.  
To comply with privacy obligations, debt relief regimes should 
be structured in a way that is consistent with privacy rights.  Court 
proceedings and court records should be cognizant of debtor 
privacy.  In the case of proceedings that involve the exposing of 
debtors’ personal information, for example, the case proceedings 
should be private, and debtors’ personal information should be 
kept private.  Trustees’ investigations into debtors’ assets and 
financial condition must respect privacy concerns.  Insolvency 
proceedings also cannot be excessive in length or divert mail 
correspondence from the debtor for an excessive period of time.225 
Finally, although an insolvency regime may be one way to 
protect against privacy infringement, it may not be necessary if 
there are sufficient privacy protections in place external to any 
response to over-indebtedness.  Restrictions on debt collection 
tactics and use and publication of debtors’ private information may 
be sufficient to satisfy privacy concerns. 
                                                     
223  15 U.S.C. 1601, §§ 605, 804–05, 808. 
224  Petition Before the European Court of Human Rights, Solorzano Verdugo 
v. Spain 35 (Jan. 18, 2012) (copy of petition on file with author); Brüggemann and 
Scheuten v. Germany, D.R. 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 103 (1976), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-74824. 
225  See Luordo v. Italy, App. No. 32190/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 17, 2003), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61231; 
Bottaro v. Italy, App. No. 56298/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 17, 2003) (Judgment) 
(holding that a fourteen year case violates property rights). 
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4.8. Human Dignity 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights opens by 
proclaiming, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.”226  The Preamble to the ICCPR and ICESCR both 
specify that the protected rights “derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person.”227  The only instrument that expressly 
includes a right to human dignity is the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, which provides:  “Every individual shall have 
the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition of his legal status.”228 
The concept of human dignity is used to refer to two different 
things:  first, the notion that each human being has inherent value 
and should not be used as a means to an end, and second, the 
protection against shame, humiliation, and marginalization.  While 
many scholars and policymakers do not consider human dignity 
protection to require prevention of shaming and marginalization, 
the Council of Europe’s Recommendation focused on ameliorating 
experiences of shame and marginalization for debtors, which 
suggests that this is a concern nation-states may wish to take into 
account when legislating responses to over-indebtedness.  This 
section should not be read as an account of what international 
human rights law requires, but rather should be read as a tool for 
nation-states who have embraced this expansive notion of human 
dignity. 
Over-indebtedness and the potential responses to over-
indebtedness raise a number of concerns relating to the protection 
of the debtors’ human dignity.  First, the condition of over-
indebtedness itself is often an experience of shame and 
marginalization. Debtors in many insolvency systems have 
described “pervasive and profound feelings of guilt, shame, and 
stigma.”229  In many cultures, the inability to manage debt 
                                                     
226  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 66, art. 1. 
227 ICCPR, supra note 62, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 81, at pmbl. 
228  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 112, art. 5.  
229  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 43.  See generally Rafael Efrat, The 
Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141 (1998); Elizabeth 
Warren, Teresa A. Sullivan & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More 
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy 
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obligations, and particularly a formal declaration of such an 
inability, may signal “a sort of social and economic death in many 
parts of the world[.]”230  Not only is the over-indebted individual 
often already marginalized, but the debt collection practices for 
resolving this over-indebtedness may exacerbate such 
marginalization.  Creditor collection tactics can be particularly 
invasive of debtors’ human dignity.  The experience of the debtor 
unable to pay for his father’s cremation and having creditors 
return his father’s body to his doorstep is one extreme example of 
infringement on a debtor’s human dignity.231  One debtor describes 
a creditor collecting an overdue cable bill who called when her 
spouse was on life support, saying “people get sick and die every 
day.  That’s not my problem,” and, on another occasion, “You 
crawl, you walk, you get a bus . . . you do whatever you can to get 
here [to make the payment.]”232 
The right to an adequate standard of living is closely entwined 
with the right to human dignity.  Stripping an individual of 
belonging and requiring them to labor primarily for the benefit of 
creditors – indefinitely – interferes with their capacity for a 
dignified life.233 
A system for reducing debt burdens could ameliorate some of 
the human dignity concerns raised here.  In cases where the 
condition of over-indebtedness interferes with the debtor’s ability 
to provide housing consistent with human dignity, a discharge of 
debt may also enable the debtor to regain dignity by becoming self-
sufficient, at least in cases where reducing the debt burden leaves 
the individual with sufficient income to meet the basic needs of 
herself and her dependents.  An insolvency regime may also 
provide an escape from humiliating debt collection practices; most 
insolvency regimes prohibit creditor collection activity subsequent 
to the filing of a petition.234 
                                                     
Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2006).  
230  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 44. 
231  Son Can’t Pay, So Father’s Body Is Returned, supra note 2. 
232  L. Stuart Ditzen, Lawyer’s Methods, Debtors’ Nightmare He’s Relentless, No 
Matter How Small the Debt.  His Tactics Are All Legal, He Says., PHILLY.COM (June 12, 
1994), http://articles.philly.com/1994-06-12/news/25831052_1_bank-accounts-
steven-b-zats-bill-collector. 
233  Federal exemptions of social security provide some additional 
protections, and federal bankruptcy exemptions are available in some states. 
234  For example, in the United States and other jurisdictions, a bankruptcy 
filing puts in place a bar on collection activity.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/4
ONDERSMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2015  4:32 PM 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR DEBT RELIEF 321 
There are, however, limits to what insolvency can accomplish 
with respect to protecting or restoring debtors’ human dignity.  
Stigmatization and marginalization will likely not be cured in an 
insolvency system unless the jurisdiction develops a method for 
ensuring that its insolvency system is capable of mitigating the 
shame or stigmatization associated with over-indebtedness or 
failure to pay debts.  Indeed, many insolvency systems may risk 
exacerbating the shame or marginalization resulting from debt-
related woes.  Some insolvency system are unnecessarily punitive 
and may provoke shame, particularly if the setting for resolution is 
a public one and particularly if bankruptcy records are made 
public.  Some jurisdictions have explicit stigmatizing provisions – 
for example, debtors may be precluded from becoming company 
directors or from traveling abroad.  An example of a punitive 
provision in an insolvency system includes the means test in the 
U.S. 2005 amendments; debtors faced a presumption that they 
were acting “abusively” if a calculation of their disposable income 
was above a certain amount, without regard to whether such 
debtors filed for bankruptcy in good faith.235 
There is also a risk that a bankruptcy filing could compound 
rather than relieve the sense of shame felt by over-indebted 
individuals, and any insolvency regime should take care to 
mitigate this risk.  For example, the London Economics Report 
recommended replacing the term “bankruptcy” with something 
less stigmatizing such as “debt adjustment.”236  Some debtors also 
find the experience of attending public bankruptcy proceedings 
induces feelings of shame; debtors’ dignity could be protected by 
private meetings rather than in open court.  In addition, making 
bankruptcy filing information publicly available can also take on a 
shaming mechanism; this can be avoided by removing debtors’ 
names and addresses from filing documents.  To avoid 
infringement on debtors’ human dignity, an insolvency system 
should not subject the debtor to shame or stigmatization. 
An insolvency system is also not the only way to protect 
against some of the human dignity concerns raised here. For 
example, in jurisdictions that provide sufficient restrictions on 
                                                     
235  See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) (stipulating the court may dismiss a case filed 
under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code by an individual debtor whose debts are 
primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtor’s consent, convert the case into a 
chapter 11 or 13 case, if the court finds abusive use of chapter 7).  
236  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at xii. 
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abusive collection methods and an adequate social safety net, 
insolvency many not add much from a human rights perspective.  
A London Economics report on best practices for protecting 
consumers in financial difficulty discussed the various types of 
restrictions on enforcement among European nations, and 
identified “common underlying principles” which, according to 
the report authors, demonstrated “the desire of legislators to 
preserve the debtor’s human rights and human dignity” while also 
facilitating fair debt collection.  The Report concluded that the 
protection of human dignity requires restrictions on debt collection 
practices.  According to the report, these restrictions included:  1) 
ensuring sustainable minimum income, 2) ensuring access to 
accommodation, 3) preventing harassment, confusion or unfair 
duress to extract payment, 4) ensuring access to utilities, 5) 
protection debtors’ privacy, and 6) ensuring collection charges are 
born by lenders.237  (Several of these concerns implicate other 
human rights that the report did not address, but that I have 
discussed in the preceding subsections of this Part). 
If the debtor does not face abusive collection methods and is 
provided with food and housing that preserve dignity, and there 
are no issues of social exclusion or shame, an insolvency regime 
resulting in debt discharge may not be required to satisfy human 
rights concerns.  On the other hand, if there is no social safety net, a 
robust insolvency regime may protect against infringement on 
human dignity; for example, where an inability to service debt 
would otherwise lead to housing conditions inconsistent with 
human dignity, the ability to obtain debt relief and a “fresh start” 
may protect human dignity – at least where the cause of the 
inability to meet basic needs is primarily due to over-
indebtedness.238 
 
5. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY EXAMPLES:                                             
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
 
The preceding Part provided an exploration of the implications 
                                                     
237  Id. at xvi. 
238  Of course, the cause is seldom exclusively over-indebtedness – income 
reduction due to medical expenses, job loss, or family break-up often initially 
causes over-indebtedness, and the cycle of over-indebtedness further reduces the 
debtor’s ability to make ends meet.  
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of specific human rights with respect to efforts to address over-
indebtedness.  This Part provides a more in-depth analysis of the 
right to property and the right to due process and their 
implications for the response to over-indebtedness.  In crafting 
debt relief measures, nations must be cognizant not only of 
debtors’ property and due process rights, but also of creditors’ 
property and due process rights.  This Part examines specific issues 
that can arise in each context:  with respect to property rights, it 
considers the modification of rights of secured creditors, and with 
respect to process rights, it considers the resolution of debtors’ 
affairs in an administrative rather than judicial context. 
 
5.1. Property Rights 
 
The human right to property has particularly interesting 
implications because both creditors and debtors have property 
rights that responses to over-indebtedness should take into 
account.  Modifications of secured creditors’ rights under an 
insolvency regime or otherwise may raise property right concerns.  
In fact, there have already been instances of secured creditors suing 
based on property right deprivations under human rights law.239  
Debtors also have rights to property that any insolvency regime 
seeking to account for human rights principles would need to 
address.  This Section first explores the right to property generally, 
then addresses the property rights of debtors and creditors, and 
then specifically considers the issue of modification of secured 
creditors’ rights in an insolvency regime. 
 
5.1.1. The Human Right to Property Generally 
 
Property rights240 are protected in several human rights 
                                                     
239  Wilson v. Sec’y. of State for Trade & Indus. (Appellant), [2003] UKHL 40, 
1 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jd030710/will-
1.htm; Wilson v. First Cnty. Trust Ltd., [2003] UKHL 40. 
240  The Right to Property, ICELANDIC HUM. RTS. CTR., available at 
http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/humanrightsconceptsideasandfora/subst
antivehumanrights/therighttoproperty/.   
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instruments.241  Property rights are not enshrined in either the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
even though Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides for the “right to own property” and asserts and 
that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”242  In 
addition, while the right to property is not enforced by any U.N. 
body, the ECHR, the ACHR, and the ACHPR each protect the right 
to property.243  Article 1 of the first Protocol to the ECHR provides: 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law.”244  
Article 21 of the ACHPR also provides for the right to “use and 
enjoyment” of property, but specifies that such right can be 
subordinated to “the interest of society.”245  Deprivation of 
property is permitted only upon “just compensation” and only “for 
reasons of public utility or social interest . . . according to the forms 
                                                     
One of the more controversial and complex human rights is the right to 
property.  The right is controversial because the very right which is seen 
by some as central to the human rights concept is considered by others to 
be an instrument for abuse, a right that protects the ‘haves’ against the 
‘have-nots’.  It is complex, because no other human right is subject to 
more qualifications and limitations and, consequently, no other right has 
resulted in more complex case-law of, for instance, the supervisory 
bodies of the ECHR.  It is complex also because it is generally regarded 
as a civil right, and by some even as an integrity right.  At the same time, 
it clearly has characteristics of social rights with significant implications 
for the distribution of social goods and wealth. Moreover, the right to 
property has major implications for several important social and 
economic rights such as the right to work, the right to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress, the right to education and the right to adequate 
housing.  Id. 
241  See generally Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of 
Property in Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 743, 757 
(Stephan Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007). 
242  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 66, art. 17. 
243   The European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 170, art. 1; 
American Convention, supra note 93, art. 21; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, supra note 112, art. 14.  In addition, of course, many nations’ 
constitutions protect property rights as well.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
244  The European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 170, art. 1. 
245  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 112, art. 21.1. 
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established by law.”246  In addition, section 21 of the ACHPR 
specifically prohibits usury and “any other form of exploitation of 
man by man.”247  The placement of the usury prohibition in the 
context of section 21 suggests a limitation on the scope of property 
rights that one can acquire.248 
The European system and Inter-American system have 
developed a relatively broad concept of property under human 
rights jurisprudence.  Under EU human rights law, “possessions” 
include both existing possessions and possessions in which an 
individual has a “‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining effective 
enjoyment of a property right.”249  Future income can even be a 
property interest if an individual has an “enforceable claim” to the 
income.250  Moreover, if a national law provides for welfare 
payments as a matter of right, the payments are property interests 
protected by Article 1.251  Claims are considered “assets” in the 
nature of property only if domestic law considers such claims to be 
                                                     
246  Id. 
247  Id. art. 21, § 3. 
248  The ACHR is the only human rights instrument to include a usury 
prohibition; however, in spite of the prohibition, most member states do not in 
fact ban usury.  
249  Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. Czech Republic, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
399 (July 10, 2002) (Grand Chamber), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22710; Kopecky v. 
Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 144 (Sept. 28, 2004), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-66758 
(citing Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98, 
2001-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 12, 2001), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59591). 
250  Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 
[830], 849 (Jan. 11, 2007) (Grand Chamber), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-78981; Ian Edgar 
(Liverpool) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37683/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 25, 
2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
5035; Levänen v. Finland, App. No. 34600/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.  (Apr. 11, 2006), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-75390; 
Wendenburg v. Germany, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 6, 2003), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-23337. 
251 Andrejeva v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 2009), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91388; 
Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-94009 S 38; Stec v. 
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 65731/01, 65900/01, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 131  (Apr. 
12, 2006), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-73198. 
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property assets.252  Creditors have a property interest at the 
moment when their claims are “sufficiently established to be 
enforceable.”253  The Inter-American Court has defined right to 
property as protecting ‘those material things which can be 
possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person’s 
patrimony; that concept includes all movables and immovables, 
corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other intangible object 
capable of having value.’”254  Property rights can include public 
benefits in the Inter-American system; in one case the reduction in 
pensions of public employees was found to be a violation of the 
right to property.255  
 
5.1.2. Creditors’ and Debtors’ Property Rights 
 
Considering the property interests of creditors and debtors 
requires a two-step analysis:  first, what is the nature of the 
property interest at stake, and second, does the public interest 
permit deprivation of this interest? 
Property rights issues are particularly salient in the secured 
credit context. Where the debt at issue is a secured debt – that is, 
where the creditor retains the right to repossess a specific item of 
the debtor’s collateral upon default – the possessory property 
interest of the debtor and the contingent property right of the 
secured creditor will collide.  Secured creditors have possessory 
and title rights that are contingent upon default.  Under human 
                                                     
252  Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 
[830], 849 (Jan. 11, 2007) (Grand Chamber); Kopecky v. Slovakia, App. No. 
44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 125 (Sept. 28, 2004); Eskelinen v. Finland, App. 
No. 63235/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (April 19, 2007), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80249; Plechanow 
v. Poland, App. No. 22279/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 7, 2009), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93302.  
253  Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 59498/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 7, 2002), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60449; 
Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 9, 1994), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57913. 
254  Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/AwasTingnicase.html. 
255  Torres Benvenuto et al. v. Peru (Five Pensioners Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Feb. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_98_ing.pdf. 
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rights principles, however, deprivation of either property interest 
is permitted if such deprivation is in the public interest.  For 
example, human rights authorities have found consumer 
protection policies to serve the public interest and justify 
limitations on creditors’ claims.256 
To undertake this analysis, we first need to understand the 
scope of the property right, remembering that the state is entitled 
to determine the scope of the property rights in the first place.  The 
boundaries of debtors’ and creditors’ property rights will be 
determined ex ante by a combination of contract principles and 
domestic law, and will include whatever expansion of those 
property rights an insolvency filing triggers.  So we ask:  What 
property right(s) are permitted to come into existence? By way of 
example, in the U.S., non-possessory non-purchase-money security 
interests in household goods are prohibited.257  Consequently, no 
property interest in such collateral can come into existence, and 
modification of those contracts could never interfere with the 
creditor’s property rights.  For nations with insolvency systems, 
property rights also include whatever expansion or contraction 
that the insolvency filing system – existing at the time of contract – 
permits. 
With respect to debtors’ property interests, debtors may have 
contractually agreed to relinquish their property rights in the 
collateral upon default.  However, domestic law can and often 
does protect debtors from fully waiving, at the contractual stage, 
their property rights upon default.  Debtors are typically given 
time to cure and prevent foreclosure of their property interest,258 
and initiation of a formal insolvency proceeding can further 
enhance the debtors’ property interests by providing for additional 
time to cure and providing a forum for modifying the contract.259  
                                                     
256  Wilson v. First Trade Cnty. Trust Ltd. [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All E.R. 
97, 130–31 (U.K.) (Hope, L.J.) [hereinafter Wilson]. 
257  Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-
1692p (2012).  
258  Foreclosure Report: Survey of State Foreclosure Laws, NAT’L CONSUMER L. 
CTR., available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_morgage/state_laws/survey-
foreclosure-card.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (providing a chart showing the 
foreclosure laws in each state). 
259  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2012) (stating bankruptcy plan may 
“provide for curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of 
payments while the case is pending”). 
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Foreclosure consistent with the debtor’s established property rights 
will not interfere with the debtors’ human right to property, 
although foreclosure may certainly implicate other human rights 
concerns, such as the debtor’s human dignity or right to adequate 
shelter and other basic needs.  This analysis will ultimately 
depend, among other things, on the housing that would be 
available to the debtor should his/her home be required to be 
relinquished. An example of foreclosure legislation potentially 
incorporating debtors’ human rights concerns is the U.K. 
Insolvency Act, which prevents foreclosure in “exceptional 
circumstances.”260  Some have argued that Human Rights Act 
requires “exceptional circumstances” to include “all instances 
where the family home and rights of children are in issue.”261 
Legislatures may also choose to protect debtors’ equity interests in 
the family home by exempting the family home from collection.262  
However, the debtor’s interest in their home will often conflict 
with the secured creditor’s property rights. 
Whether the secured creditor’s property right is the right to the 
collateral or something else (e.g., the right to the value of the 
collateral – or something less than the value of the collateral) 
depends upon whether the law at the time of the contract enforces 
repossession rights or allows for the creditor’s right to be satisfied 
by another means; for example, payment of the value of the 
collateral. 
Insight into the scope of creditors’ property rights under a 
human rights framework can be found in Wilson v. First County 
Trust.  Wilson is a U.K. case brought under the Human Rights Acts, 
which gives the ECHR the power of domestic enforcement.263  The 
case demonstrates how creditors may claim that new debt relief 
                                                     
260  UK Insolvency Act 335(A)(3). 
261  Helene Pines Richman, Using the Human Rights Act to Save the Family 
Home, available at 
http://www.9stonebuildings.com/publications/human_rights.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2014).  
The Human Rights Act 1998 has the potential to redefine a 
bankrupt’s family’s rights, and to possibly save the family home.  It 
applies to dealings between private individuals through the duty of 
public authorities, including courts and tribunals, not to act in a 
way which is incompatible with Convention rights and to protect 
individuals against breaches of their rights (section 6(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998). 
262  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 80. 
263  Wilson, supra note 259, ¶ 10. 
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legislation may impair their property interests.  In Wilson, a 
pawnbroker’s loan was originally deemed unenforceable under the 
Consumer Credit Act of 1974 because it incorrectly stated loan 
terms.264  However, the Secretary of State appealed, fearing that the 
Consumer Credit Act, in rendering such loans unenforceable, 
violated the First Protocol, providing for right to peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions.265  As discussed, the First Protocol 
provides that deprivation of possessions is permitted only “when 
in the public interest,” and states that the preclusion of such 
deprivation “shall not . . . in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest . . .”266  Thus, 
under the European Convention, property deprivation is permitted 
if necessary for the “public interest” or “general interest.”267 
The members of the Court found no violation of the First 
Protocol, but differed in their reasoning.  Lord Nicholls concluded 
that the lack of enforcement of the credit agreement was indeed a 
“deprivation of possessions.”268  On the other hand, he reasoned 
that such a deprivation was permissible as a “legitimate exercise in 
consumer protection.”269  He articulated that the Consumer Credit 
Act constituted a “legitimate exercise in consumer protection” 
because 1) the legislation served the “public interest” and 2) the 
legislation was a “proportionate means by which to solve a social 
problem.”270  Nicholls concluded that although the legislation may 
“involve the compulsory transfer of property from one person to 
another,”271 such deprivation was permissible because “[t]here is a 
public interest in protecting [people who want to borrow money] 
                                                     
264  Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. 
265  Id. ¶ 8.  The Secretary also brought a claim under Article 6 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as 
incorporated into U.K. law in the 1998 Human Rights Act), providing for right to 
a fair trial.  Id. ¶ 8.  The House of Lords rejected the Article 6 claim, holding that 
the Consumer Credit Act’s rendering noncompliant credit agreements 
unenforceable was a “limitation on the substantive scope of creditor’s rights” 
rather than a circumscription of proper judicial procedure.  Id. ¶ 37. 
266  Id. ¶ 8 (citing First Protocol). 
267  Id. 
268  Id. ¶ 44. 
269  Id. ¶ 138.   
270  Id.  
271  See James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, 8 EHRR 123, 141, ¶ 68 
(Feb. 21, 1986). 
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from exploitation.”272  With respect to the proportionality holding, 
Nicholls found that “[t]he means chosen to cure the social mischief 
[was] appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse 
impact.”273  Nicholls expressed a willingness to defer to the 
legislature on “matters of broad social policy,”274 and determined 
that it was sufficient for a finding of proportionality that 
Parliament considered creditors’ Convention rights.275  
Parliament’s consideration of and rejection of alternative sanctions 
was sufficient to show that it considered creditors’ property 
rights.276 
Lord Hope and Lord Scott, in contrast to Lord Nicholls, 
reasoned that article 1 of the First Protocol was not engaged 
because the pawnbroker lacked a property right.277  That is, the 
Consumer Credit Act prevented [the pawnbroker] from ever 
obtaining a property right against Wilson.  Scott reasoned: 
 
[A]rticle 1 of the First Protocol is directed to interference 
with existing possessions or property rights.  [The 
pawnbroker] never had, at any stage in the history of the 
loan agreement, the right to enforce against Mrs. Wilson the 
repayment of the £ 5000. Neither the 1974 Act as a whole 
nor section 127(3) in particular constituted an interference 
with a preexisting right of [the pawnbroker] to enforce 
repayment by Mrs. Wilson of the £5000.  The Act, and 
section 127(3) prevented [the pawnbroker] from ever 
possessing that right.278   
 
Hope and Scott suggested that, had the legislation been enacted 
after the loan had already been made, the pawnbroker’s property 
                                                     
272  Wilson, supra note 257, ¶ 68. 
273  Id. ¶ 62. 
274  Id. ¶ 70.  This reasoning is based in the ECHR doctrine of the “margin of 
appreciation” which provides deference to states on unsettled questions of human 
rights policy.  See generally Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation 
and Discretion Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. FILES 
1, 7–13, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-
EN-HRFILES-17%282000%29.pdf.  
275  Wilson, supra note 257, ¶ 75. 
276  Id. ¶ 72.  
277  Id. ¶ 108.   
278  Id. ¶ 168.  
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rights may have been implicated.  However, this does not mean 
that a human rights violation would have been held to occur; in 
that case the legislature would need to demonstrate that the 
deprivation was necessary for the public interest, a condition that 
Lord Nicholls found to be met in this instance in any event. 
The foregoing analysis provides two helpful insights for the 
response to over-indebtedness and the creation of new insolvency 
regimes.  First, new legislation that impairs existing creditors 
property interests may raise human rights concerns.  This does not 
mean that the legislation cannot be enacted without violating 
creditors’ property rights.  All that is required is that the legislature 
considers creditors’ property rights and attempt to identify 
alternatives.  In fact, Wilson indicates that explicit consideration of 
creditors’ property interests may not be necessary; however, it may 
help prevent suits being filed.  The second takeaway is that for new 
creditors – creditors whose claims arise after the passage of new 
legislation – there will not be a property deprivation claim because 
the national legislation determines the boundaries of existing 
property rights.279  That is, if national legislation proclaims that a 
private contract is unenforceable it cannot give rise to a property 
right in the first instance.   
 
5.1.3. Property Rights Compliant Insolvency Regimes 
 
Creation of an insolvency regime or certain changes to an 
existing insolvency regime may implicate the property rights of 
creditors or debtors.  This does not mean, however, that changing 
the law would be impermissible from a human rights standpoint. 
Insolvency laws generally are not considered to violate debtors’ 
peaceful enjoyment of their possessions; however, if the insolvency 
proceedings are too long in duration, they may constitute 
impermissible control of debtors’ property.280  The European Court 
                                                     
279  For an analysis of bankruptcy law from the lens of the constitutional right 
to property, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional 
Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 660–69 (2008).  
280  See Bottaro v. Italy, App. No. 56298/00 (Oct. 17, 2003) (Judgment) 
(showing that twelve year insolvency proceedings violate property rights); 
Luordo v. Italy, App. No. 32190/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 17, 2003), ¶¶ 68–71, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
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of Human Rights has found violations in the context of two 
business insolvency proceedings (finding 12 and 14 years to be 
excessive control of debtors’ property in violation of Article 1, 
Protocol 1).281  There is no reason to think that the same analysis 
would not apply to consumer proceedings. 
With respect to insolvency laws that change creditors’ rights, 
new laws would not raise property concerns for contracts going 
forward because it would be a limit on the property right that is 
permitted to come into existence.  Second, even with respect to 
existing contracts, deprivation of property rights is permissible on 
public interest grounds.282  For example, after the Finnish 
insolvency laws were reformed, existing creditors brought a case in 
the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the insolvency 
law interfered with their property rights under Article 1, Protocol 
1.283  The Court, however, held that interference with the 
applicant’s property rights was justified because the legislation 
served legitimate social and economic policies and the burden on 
the creditor was not excessive.284  Still, the Court retained the 
possibility of concluding that “irrevocable extinction of a debt” 
would be an excessive burden on existing creditors.285 
With respect to contracts going forward, if the secured creditor 
is entitled to a lesser property right than the interest for which they 
contracted, the property right is not what was contracted for but 
rather what the insolvency regime guarantees the creditor.  For 
example, under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code the property right of a 
creditor who takes a security interest in most kinds of personal 
property is limited to the value of the collateral – not the collateral 
itself – despite what the contract indicates.  A number of liens can 
be stripped in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings, including unperfected 
security interests, many judgment liens, and, in some jurisdictions, 
                                                     
61231#{"itemid":["001-61231"]} (demonstrating that fourteen year insolvency 
proceedings violate property rights).  
281  Id. 
282  European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014); American Convention, supra note 93, art. 21.   
283  Bäck v. Finland, App. No. 37598/97, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 37 (Oct. 20, 
2004), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
61929. 
284  Id. ¶¶ 50–62. 
285  Id. ¶ 63. 
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junior mortgages for which the value of the collateral at the time of 
filing is insufficient to satisfy any portion of the debt.286  
Modification of the secured creditor’s contract will thus not be a 
property deprivation as long as the secured creditor’s interest in 
the value of the collateral is respected.  If no value is available, 
there is no property interest, and there can be no deprivation. 
In the mortgage context, the property rights of a holder of a 
residential mortgage that is the debtor’s primary residence are 
larger than the property right of an investor.  The mortgage cannot 
be modified if it is a mortgage on a primary residence.  Thus, the 
lender is guaranteed the collateral itself, whereas if the property is 
an investment property, the debtor can elect to modify the 
mortgage so that payments are reduced to the value of the 
collateral rather than the contractual payments agreed upon.287  
The latter lender’s property right is thus not the collateral itself but 
only the value of the collateral. 
At the time of entering into the secured credit relationship with 
the debtor, the secured creditor is aware of the boundaries of any 
property right he will acquire in debtor’s property, and thus 
cannot complain of a property right violation if the debtor uses 
insolvency proceedings to modify the secured creditor’s claim.  
Modification of residential mortgages may raise property rights 
concerns.  However, for mortgages that come into existence after 
the change to the insolvency regime, this will not be an issue.  Such 
lenders’ rights may be limited to the value of the collateral or 
whatever value the default regime determines.  More importantly, 
existing mortgages can also be modified consistent with human 
rights concerns as long as such modification is in the public 
interest.  In other words, one insight to be gleaned from evaluation 
of insolvency regimes in light of secured creditors’ property rights 
in a human rights framework is that secured creditors’ claims are 
not sacrosanct. 
This does not mean that there will not be impediments under 
national law (such as constitutional property rights)288 that may 
                                                     
286  11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
287  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2012).  
288  See generally Charles Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, The Fifth Amendment, 
and the Limited Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, American Bankruptcy 
Institute Symposium on Chapter 11 Reform 2014 (arguing that U.S. bankruptcy 
law has mistakenly been required to comply with Takings Clause when 
modifying rights of secured creditors).  
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need to be addressed, but human rights principles will not be a 
barrier to an insolvency regime that modifies secured creditors’ 
claims.  In evaluating competing property interests on public 
interest grounds, legislatures may need to consider when public 
interest weighs in favor of possessory rights and when it weighs in 
favor of secured lenders or landlords.  On the one hand, 
homelessness is a serious social problem that may have spiraling 
deleterious consequences.  For example, the prevention of 
homelessness is thus a legitimate public interest goal.  If 
foreclosure or eviction is shown to lead to homelessness, this is a 
serious public interest concern that legislatures are empowered to 
address consistent with human rights standards.  For instance, a 
change in the U.S. mortgage laws to permit modification of 
mortgage holders’ secured claims in bankruptcy proceedings could 
properly have been defended as necessary to prevent 
homelessness, poverty, and even macroeconomic distress.289 
Furthermore, foreclosures are also often associated with 
disruptions to children’s schooling and thus, can also interfere with 
the debtor’s children’s right to an education – not only a public 
interest concern but also a human rights concern under the 
ECHR.290  
It should be noted that domestic law may provide narrower 
grounds for interference with property rights than human rights 
law.  The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has stated that 
bankruptcy laws shall not be “construed to eliminate property 
rights which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of 
an explicit command from Congress.”291  While not described as 
                                                     
289  After the crisis, U.S. lenders refused to timely recognize the sharply 
diminished value of home loans on their books.  If borrower payments could have 
been reduced to reflect the actual value of their homes, they may have been able 
to remain in their homes and service most of the debt.  This would have directly 
benefited banks, and would have also lessened the blow to the real economy with 
fewer borrowers losing their homes to foreclosure and fewer housing-related job 
losses.  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 28.  If regulations permit financial 
institutions to reflect a misleadingly optimistic view of account values, over-
valuation can drag on and become exacerbated, “and by the time when the reality 
of the value-destroying insolvency is acknowledge, it is too late to avoid serious 
disruptions reverberating far beyond the creditor’s own balance sheet[.]”  Levitin, 
supra note 33, 585 (2009). 
290  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 170, at Protocol, art. 
2.  
291  United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982).  For an in-depth 
analysis of U.S. constitutional property rights and bankruptcy, see Lipson, supra 
note 282. 
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permitting deprivation of property rights on the grounds of public 
interest, the opinion suggests that Congress has the discretion to 
eliminate property rights of secured creditors, even retroactively.  
Contrary to this, other cases suggest that retroactive lien avoidance 
would constitute a taking and would require compensation.292 
The property example again illuminates the extent to which the 
response to over-indebtedness will depend on background rules:  
to satisfy human rights standards, existing property rights must be 
respected, but property rights will have been determined ex ante 
by the nation crafting the insolvency regime.  The right to 
property, from a human rights view, does not create property 
rights, it merely protects existing property rights.   
 
5.2. The Right to Due Process 
 
5.2.1. Due Process Rights as Human Rights Generally 
 
Human rights instruments require a fair trial to determine 
matters concerning rights or obligations; this includes both 
debtors’ and creditors’ property interests and privacy concerns.293  
The ACHR, ECHR, and ICCPR all include rights to prompt and 
fair trials conducted by an “independent and impartial tribunal.”294 
                                                     
292  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46 (1960) (avoiding a lien 
retroactively has “every possible element of a Fifth Amendment taking.”). 
293  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 50. 
294   
Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within 
a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, 
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of 
a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights 
and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.   
 
American Convention, supra note 93, art. 8, § 1.  “In the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations . . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 
101, art. 6. 
The ICCPR also requires a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, 
and impartial tribunal established by law” in the determination of rights and 
obligations.  ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 14. 
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The ACHR and ICCPR additionally require that the tribunal be 
“competent.” 
 
5.2.2. Debtors’ and Creditors’ Due Process Rights 
 
Under human rights principles, both debtors and creditors 
have the right to have their protected human rights and other civil 
rights and obligations determined by an independent, impartial, 
and competent tribunal.  This includes property rights as well as 
contractual obligations.295  Hence, creditors attempting to enforce 
their contractual rights must give debtors the right to defend 
against accusations of default in the context of a human rights 
compliant tribunal.  In addition, the right to due process may be 
violated if the judiciary is enforcing laws that violate human rights, 
including contract clauses that are discriminatory.296  Creditors, 
however, are equally entitled to protection from a human rights 
perspective.  Consequently, creditors should have the opportunity 
to assert their contractual and property rights before an 
independent, impartial, and competent tribunal.  Some of the 
discrimination concerns raised above may also play a role in the 
due process context as equal protection concerns.  If the law 
provides different treatment to different classes of individuals with 
no rational basis for the distinction, such as arbitrarily inferior 
remedies for debtors as opposed to creditors, debtors’ due process 
rights may not be satisfied. 
 
5.2.3. Respecting Debtors’ and Creditors’ Due Process Rights in 
Insolvency Regimes 
 
Some countries have trended toward resolving insolvency 
proceedings via an administrative rather than a judiciary process.  
The London Economics report noted that administrative resolution 
of debt seems to be more affordable and accessible.297  However, to 
                                                     
295  See MIGREUROP, Demanda Al Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 
available at http://www.migreurop.org/article2300.html?lang=fr.  See generally 
Petition Before the European Court of Human Rights, Verdugo v. Spain 35 (Jan. 
18, 2012) (copy of petition on file with author). 
296  Id. 
297  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at 12. 
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the extent any human right – including secured creditors’ or 
debtors’ property rights, for example – is determined in insolvency 
proceedings, the right to due process may require a tribunal as 
opposed to administrative proceedings.  The London Economics 
report asserted that if lender responsibility for insolvency is 
acknowledged and consumer protection is accepted as an 
overriding concern, the need for judicial involvement can be 
rejected.298  However, this may not satisfy human rights 
requirements.  For example, if secured creditors’ property rights or 
debtors’ property rights are resolved or determined in bankruptcy 
court, it may be necessary that the tribunal be “independent and 
impartial.”299  That said, it is important to remember that the right 
to property is only as expansive as background rules permit it to 
be.  Therefore, a movement from a judicial insolvency regime to an 
administrative insolvency regime may prove problematic for 
existing claims but not for new security interests.  After an 
administrative regime was implemented, secured creditors would 
be aware that their claim is subject to determination in 
administrative proceedings should the debtor become insolvent 
and choose to access the regime.  Put in another way, the scope of 
their property interest is determined in part by potential resolution 
in administrative proceedings. 
Insolvency regimes can also be a method for protecting 
debtors’ procedural rights where the civil judicial system has 
proven inadequate. For example, unreasonable delays in 
proceedings involving property or privacy rights may interfere 
with the process rights protected in these instruments.  In New 
York City, lenders are notorious for dragging out foreclosure 
proceedings and for refusing to engage in good faith settlement 
procedures as required.300  Bankruptcy provides an alternative 
forum for addressing mortgage defaults, and may aid in satisfying 
debtors’ due process rights. 
As discussed, this analysis illuminates the role of background 
rules in crafting a human-rights-compliant response to over-
indebtedness.  Whether an administrative system is appropriate 
                                                     
298  Id. 
299  ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 14.  
300  MFY Legal Services, JUSTICE UNSETTLED: How the Foreclosure Shadow 
Docket & Discontinuances Prevent New Yorkers from Saving Their Homes (May 2012), 
available at http://www.mfy.org/wp-content/uploads/Justice-Unsettled-plus-
APP.pdf. 
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depends upon what property and contractual rights default rules 
have established.  Human rights instruments do not guarantee any 
specific contract or property.  Rights such as free speech and 
freedom from discrimination are promised, and the right to due 
process requires proper adjudication of these rights, but it is not 
the human rights system that brings into existence specific 
contractual or property rights.  Rather, once a nation has 
established the scope of its citizens’ property and contractual 
rights, these rights are to be enforced by a fair, impartial, and 
competent tribunal. 
 
6. INSIGHTS FOR POLICYMAKING AROUND OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 
 
Having examined specific human rights and the link between 
these specific rights and nations’ efforts to address over-
indebtedness, I now offer a few over-arching considerations that 
should inform policymaking around over-indebtedness to the 
extent human rights concerns are taken into account.  The first key 
takeaway is that those seeking to harmonize responses to over-
indebtedness in a way that reflects human rights concerns should 
acknowledge that a one-size-fits-all approach may not be 
appropriate given different default rules and policy preferences.  A 
human rights based evaluation of nations’ insolvency systems or 
lack thereof must be contextualized in nations’ background rules 
including:  1) the available social safety net, 2) the nature of 
consumer credit contracts that default laws permit to exist, and 3) 
permissible collection methods.  The U.S., with its weak social 
safety net, robust consumer credit apparatus, and aggressive credit 
collection strategies needs a robust debt relief system from a 
human rights perspective.  Second, a formal, legal debt relief 
system may not be the optimal solution for social or cultural 
reasons external to the default legal regime.  For instance, informal 
or social solutions may be preferable (or at least complementary), 
particularly where legal systems are ineffectual.  Finally, if an 
insolvency regime is determined to be the best method or the 
necessary method of ensuring that human rights obligations or 
principles are satisfied, the relief provided must be effective.  If the 
relief the insolvency regime purports to provide is not in fact 
accessible or available to all debtors who need it, it will fail as a 
tool for satisfying human rights goals. 
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6.1. Contextualizing the Evaluation of Responses to Over-
Indebtedness 
 
A human rights informed response to over-indebtedness 
should take into account at least three aspects of nations’ legal and 
regulatory frameworks external to their response to over-
indebtedness.  First, whether and what type of insolvency relief is 
necessary from a human rights perspective depends on the safety 
net that is available to debtors outside the insolvency regime.  
Second, the appropriate response to over-indebtedness depends 
upon the limitations that nations impose upon the types of debt 
relationships that are permitted to come into existence.  Third, the 
proscribed method of resolving cases of over-indebtedness will 
vary depending upon limitations nations set on creditors’ 
collection activities, including how much of the debtors’ assets and 
income are permitted to be seized, and the circumstances under 
which such seizure can occur. 
 
6.1.1. Available Social Safety Net 
 
Whether human rights principles require an insolvency regime 
to treat over-indebtedness, and whether these principles require 
the system to contain specific features (such as access to prompt 
discharge) depends upon what other methods of support a nation 
makes available to debtors.  Nations with robust social safety nets; 
that is, those that provide sufficient funding to ensure that 
individuals have access to housing, food, and healthcare, may not 
need an insolvency regime to comply with human rights 
obligations or standards.  If indebted individuals are assured food, 
housing and access to medical treatment even if creditors are 
consuming much of their disposable income, their human rights 
may be intact despite heavy debt loads.  Nations can draw their 
own policy conclusions regarding whether creditors or taxpayers 
should bear the cost of satisfying the debtor’s subsistence needs.  
Nations that have chosen not to guarantee access to adequate food, 
housing, or healthcare may be more in need of a well-developed 
debt relief system. 
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The United States does not provide the level of social support 
for its citizens that most European countries provide; housing, 
food, and unemployment subsidies are much lower per capita in 
the United States.301  Yet even with the 2005 restrictions to 
accessing debt relief, the U.S. continues to have one of the most 
consumer-debtor friendly insolvency regimes in the world.  Most 
consumer debtors are – on paper – eligible for almost immediate 
discharge of consumer debt, assuming they are willing to 
relinquish any non-exempt assets.302  This does not mean that the 
U.S. provides the most support for debtors overall.  The inverse 
relationship between robustness of the social safety net and 
robustness of the debt relief regime may not be accidental.  The 
relationship may reflect a policy choice to satisfy obligations to 
citizens in different ways – through taxpayer funded subsidies or 
through what amount to levies on creditors.  In turn, some argue, 
this has also increased costs to consumers, although studies have 
not so far proven that increased debt relief results in higher credit 
costs.303  For countries with limited social safety nets, like the 
United States, the insolvency regime may be a crucial component 
of satisfying human rights obligations or complying with human 
rights principles whereas in other countries the insolvency regime 
will play a minor role. 
Of course, an insolvency regime cannot be a complete 
substitute for a social safety net from a human rights perspective.  
Debt relief will only aid in satisfying human rights obligations 
where the violation is caused by over-indebtedness and can be 
removed by relieving debt.  An insolvency regime will not 
augment the human rights of impoverished but not indebted 
citizens who lack access to basic needs and whose dignity rights 
may be imperiled. 
It is also important to note that a robust social safety net alone 
                                                     
301  Marcus Walker & Roger Thurow, U.S., Europe Are an Ocean Apart on 
Human Toll of Joblessness, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124155150793788477. 
302  11 U.S.C. § 707 (2006).  Even though above-median debtors face an 
additional hurdle to filing, they must pass the so-called “means test” which 
permits a Chapter 7 filing only if their disposable income is below specified caps.  
However, only around 8% of Chapter 7 filers have incomes above the state 
median. 
303  Elisa Brodi & Giacomo Rodano, Debt Discharge & Credit 12 (Preliminary 
Draft, Sept. 2013, on file with author) (discussing the “scant” evidence regarding 
the relationship of debt relief and credit cost, and reporting results of an empirical 
study indicating no increase cost of credit where discharge is available). 
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will likely not be sufficient to satisfy all of the human rights 
concerns raised here.  For example, requiring the debtor to exist on 
subsistence level income indefinitely – diverting all benefits of the 
labor to creditors indefinitely – may infringe upon the debtor’s 
human dignity, even if the state provides food and shelter.  
Moreover, privacy and anti-discrimination principles must still be 
met.  A nation that provides adequate food and housing, yet still 
permits creditors to invade debtors’ dwellings and permits 
employers to discriminate would nonetheless be incompliant with 
human rights concerns. 
 
6.1.2. Limitations on Consumer Credit Contracts 
 
Nations that carefully regulate consumer credit contracts ex 
ante may be less likely to have an over-indebtedness problem or 
may be less likely to permit easy discharge of consumer credit 
obligations.  Until recently, Italy did not have a mechanism for 
individuals to discharge their consumer debt,304but nevertheless 
Italy sharply limits usury and provides harsh penalties for usury 
violations.305  Some nations simply do not have many over-
indebted individuals because they do not have a robust consumer 
lending apparatus.306  In such economies, illegal and unregulated 
lending may occur.  These may have human rights obligations with 
respect to such lending (in particular where debtors’ lives or well-
being are threatened by nefarious collection methods, particularly 
in the case of loan sharks), but an insolvency regime may not be an 
effective method of meeting these obligations.  In other economies, 
low levels of consumer lending may be a policy choice, or 
extremely robust consumer protection laws may sharply limit the 
number of individuals who become over-indebted.307 
It may be the case that if a nation does not have an over-
indebtedness problem, an insolvency regime will not be necessary 
to comply with its human rights obligations related to over-
                                                     
304  Business debt, however, was previously dischargable pursuant to the 
2005–2006 Bankruptcy Reform.  Decreto Legge 16 marzo 1942, n. 267 (It.) 
(amended 2006, 2007 and 2009) [Decree Law of Mar. 16, 1942].  
305  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at 62–63. 
306  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
307  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 9. 
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indebtedness.308  On the other hand, even if over-indebtedness is 
not an epidemic in a given country, that does not mean that there 
are not over-indebted individuals who may be in need of 
protection and whose human rights may be compromised by their 
debt situation or the attendant collection activities. Even if 
consumer credit is not a serious concern, there may be other 
incidences of indebtedness, such as medical debt, resulting in over-
indebted individuals and implicating human rights principles.  To 
the extent that over-indebtedness is due to medical debt, measures 
may be needed to address related human rights concerns even if 
consumer credit contracts are carefully circumscribed.  
While nations that do not have a high level of consumer debt or 
that limit the types of consumer debt that can exist may not need a 
robust debt relief regime, nations whose economies rely heavily on 
consumer credit – and nations that permit particularly onerous 
consumer credit contracts – are more likely to require meaningful 
redress for over-indebtedness that takes into account human rights 
concerns.  An insolvency regime may be one way of mitigating the 
consequences of “high-risk, high-profit” lending which is both 
more likely to trigger economic human rights infractions (as well 
as more likely to generate systemic risk concerns).309  Payday loans 
and other subprime loans are particularly likely to cause debtors to 
become trapped in a “never-ending debt spiral” that interferes 
with their ability to meet their basic economic needs.310 
Not only will the nature of credit contracts that are permitted 
to exist determine the type of relief necessary to protect debtors’ 
rights to adequate living and dignity, but the nature of these 
contracts will also determine what is required in terms of property 
and due process rights, as discussed above.  The default legal 
regime will determine the scope of debtors’ and creditors’ property 
and due process rights.  Any response to over-indebtedness or 
insolvency regime will need to protect the property rights it has 
allowed to come into existence through consumer credit contracts 
and will need to provide appropriate process to protect the 
                                                     
308  That is not to say that all human rights obligations will be satisfied; other 
action may of course be needed to address poverty concerns or other problems 
separate from the issue of over-indebtedness. 
309  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 31. 
310  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 32; Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest - 
Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 563, 564 (2010). 
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contractual and property rights that have been promised. 
 
6.1.3. Default Collection Remedies 
 
If a nation sharply circumscribes creditors’ collection remedies, 
an insolvency regime devoted to discharging or reorganizing the 
debtors’ obligations may not be needed.  For example, if a nation 
exempts the debtor’s home and most of the debtor’s wages from 
collection and otherwise prohibits creditor harassment, an official 
insolvency regime may not be required for a nation to comply with 
basic human rights obligations relating to debt relief.311 Nations 
can prohibit lenders from invading debtors’ privacy and can also 
prohibit lender discrimination.  However, if insufficient 
exemptions or restrictions are in place – or if creditors routinely 
ignore such prohibitions – the nation may need an official 
insolvency process to free debtors to meet their basic needs and 
avoid creditor harassment. 
The Council of Europe’s Recommendation acknowledged that 
limitations on collection activity may be needed to comply with 
human rights obligations, stating: 
Over-indebtedness may have a strongly adverse impact on 
the development of children in over-indebted families.  It 
may not only reduce the capacity of adult members of the 
family to re-engage in an income-generating activity but, 
inter alia, can also prevent or substantially limit the same 
capacity for their children.  Therefore, debt recovery 
procedures should protect the essential assets of the debtor 
by means of, for instance, garnishment of a part of income 
to ensure that a fair balance is struck between the basic 
living needs of the debtor and his or her family and the 
efficiency of debt repayment.312 
It is again important to keep in mind, however, that restrictions 
on collection activities may not resolve all human rights concerns 
related to over-indebtedness, just as a robust social safety net may 
be insufficient.  Restricting aggressive and invasive collection 
practices may resolve many privacy and discrimination concerns; 
                                                     
311  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 9. 
312  Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10, at 15. 
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however, other parties (such as employers) may also need 
regulation against discrimination and privacy invasions pertaining 
to over-indebtedness.  In addition, some individuals may be 
severely over-indebted, and they may lack access to adequate 
housing and food, and/or their human dignity may be imperiled – 
even if creditor collection activity is very carefully circumscribed.  
Examination of each human rights principle is necessary to form a 
full picture of the needs of debtors and the human rights risks that 
over-indebtedness creates, and also provides an opportunity for a 
comprehensive response to the human rights issues this analysis 
brings to light. 
 
6.2. Barriers and Alternatives to Insolvency Regimes 
 
Although some response to over-indebtedness seems necessary 
from a human rights perspective, an insolvency regime may not be 
feasible or may not be the most desirable way of meeting these 
obligations.  First, in nations where judicial processes are corrupt 
or otherwise problematic, or where the public does not accept or 
rely on the legal system, an insolvency regime may not be the 
optimal or exclusive solution for satisfying human rights 
principles.313  In other cases, societies may not view indebtedness 
as a burden that falls on the individual, but may treat indebtedness 
as a matter to be resolved by the debtor’s family, tribe, or some 
other social group to which the debtor pertains.314 
Even if over-indebtedness triggers human rights concerns, an 
insolvency regime is not the only possible response, and the nature 
of the insolvency regime can vary and still comply with the human 
rights principles discussed here.  Some jurisdictions prefer 
voluntary settlement to a formal debt relief procedure, citing 
benefits including reduced stigma, reduced court cost, flexibility, 
and political expedience.315  However, if a voluntary settlement 
regime is the method for responding to human rights concerns, it 
must be accessible and effective, as discussed below.316  So far, in 
practice successful voluntary settlements have seldom been 
                                                     
313  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
314  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
315  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 46. 
316  See infra Part X. 
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achieved, particularly absent some type of institutional support.317  
In some jurisdictions, voluntary settlement opportunities have 
been co-opted by questionable for-profit entities seeking to extract 
some value from over-indebted individuals, sometimes taking 
advantage of desperation and lack of understanding.318  If 
voluntary settlement is to represent a meaningful opportunity for 
rehabilitation, there must be some mechanism for halting 
enforcement actions while negotiations are ongoing, debtors must 
have access to meaningful guidance in the process, and there must 
be appropriate oversight to ensure creditor participation in good 
faith, including limits on the ability of dissenting creditors to derail 
the agreements.319 
 
6.3. The “Effectiveness” of Responses to Over-Indebtedness 
 
If evaluation of the default response to over-indebtedness (that 
is, the fate of over-indebted individuals absent an insolvency 
regime) reveals that such individuals are exposed to human rights 
violations, nations may wish or may be required to provide 
debtors with an opportunity to alleviate their indebted condition – 
and the available remedy should be accessible and effective.  This 
section focuses on some of the barriers to access to insolvency 
regimes that may make insolvency relief an ineffective remedy. 
Human rights instruments typically provide for “effective” 
remedy or recourse for the redress of violations of the protected 
human rights. The ACHR provides for “simple and prompt 
recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or 
tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental 
rights . . . .”320  Signatories also agree to ensure the enforcement of 
                                                     
317  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 46–48.   
318 See, e.g., What’s the Difference Between a Credit Counselor and a Debt Settlement 
Company?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,  
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1449/whats-difference-between-
credit-counselor-and-debt-settlement-company.html (last updated June 18, 2014) 
(explaining that debt settlement agencies are for-profit companies and often do 
not achieve better terms for debtors than debtors can achieve on their own, and 
that filing for bankruptcy is often a better option). 
319  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
320  American Convention, supra note 93, art. 25. 
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remedies granted.321  The ECHR requires “an effective remedy 
before a national authority” for those whose Convention rights 
have been violated.322  Signatories to the ICCPR also agree to 
“adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect” to Covenant rights and to provide for an “effective remedy” 
for the violation of the rights.323  Thus, if in reviewing the situation 
of over-indebtedness, a nation elects to use an insolvency regime to 
meet some of its human rights obligations, relief must be 
accessible.  The ICESCR does not contain a provision requiring 
effective remedies, but rather requires states to pursue the 
“progressive realization” of the rights described.  States wishing to 
incorporate human rights concerns raised in the ICESCR may 
nevertheless be interested in assuring that the aspired remedies are 
indeed effective. 
The World Bank noted that barriers to insolvency relief can 
have deleterious consequences for debtors:  “[h]igh access barriers 
to the formal system of relief may result in individuals being in a 
state of ‘informal insolvency’” in which they “lose incentives to 
participate in society, may require continuing state support, or 
may go ‘underground’ for several years to avoid creditors . . .”324 
Creditor collection, the Report’s drafters noted, brings little to 
creditors but “inflicts a significant social and emotional toll.”325 
In some jurisdictions, including the United States, cost 
represents a significant barrier to access.326  Countries employ a 
variety of approaches for financing debtor access to their 
insolvency system, including:  1) direct state funding of both 
debtor and creditor costs, 2) funding from higher asset 
bankruptcies subsidizes low or no asset bankruptcies, 3) state 
funding for professionals, 4) funding from levies on creditors, and 
5) no state support.327 
                                                     
321  American Convention, supra note 93, art. 25, § 2. 
322  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 101, art. 13. 
323 ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 2, §§ 2, 3. 
324  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 65. 
325  Id. 
326  Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s 
Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1933, 1957–59 (2011); Liz Weston, When You’re Too Poor for Bankruptcy, MSN 
MONEY (Aug. 20, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://money.msn.com/credit-rating/when-
youre-too-poor-for-bankruptcy-liz-weston. 
327  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 61. 
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Some barriers to access are not financial but rather are 
procedural.  Some jurisdictions provide relatively open access328 to 
debt relief in insolvency proceedings, while others sharply limit 
entry into the system.  Some jurisdictions only permit debt relief 
for debtors who show “permanent insolvency,” or a showing that 
indebtedness is due to an event beyond the debtor’s control; other 
jurisdictions require a showing of good faith.329  Where nations 
have erected such barriers designed (purportedly) to limit access to 
debtors who could afford to repay their debts, such barriers have 
often in practice restricted access for precisely those debtors whose 
economic human rights are most imperiled by their over-indebted 
situation. 
The United States is one jurisdiction in which debt relief in 
bankruptcy is likely necessary from a human rights perspective, 
yet there are both legal and cultural barriers to effective relief.  In 
2005, Congress erected substantial barriers to debt relief.  Debtors 
in need of relief could no longer access bankruptcy immediately in 
many cases.  Debtors are first required to obtain counseling and 
gather a number of documents, including tax returns and pay 
stubs.330  These barriers hit the poorest debtors hardest, as many of 
the new requirements resulted in raising the cost of bankruptcy.331  
As discussed above in analyzing the anti-discrimination 
requirements, debt discharge is not available to all debtors equally; 
debtors in certain jurisdictions and non-white debtors are much 
less likely to obtain a discharge.332 
Insolvency relief is also arguably not accessible if accessing the 
regime involves stigmatization or other deleterious consequences.  
For example, in Austria debt cancellation is only available if the 
debtor agrees to inform future employers of the insolvency.  As a 
result, few debtors choose the debt cancellation option and instead 
enter some kind of voluntary repayment plan. The employer 
notification requirement may constitute a de facto bar to debt relief 
                                                     
328  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 64 (defining “open access” systems as 
those in which “an individual who meets an insolvency test such as the inability 
to pay debts as they fall due may, without more, gain access to an insolvency 
procedure permitting an ultimate discharge of debts”). 
329  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 64. 
330  11 U.S.C. § 521 (2012). 
331  Jon Chavez, At 8, Insolvency Reform Act Falls Short of Goals, THE BLADE 
(Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/Economy/2013/10/06/At-8-
insolvency-reform-act-falls-short-of-goals.html.  
332  See supra Part IV.C. 
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in many cases.333 
If a country is relying on its exemption laws to protect against 
human rights violations rather than on an insolvency regime, the 
exemption laws must also be an effective remedy.  In many states, 
exemptions are not automatic but debtor must file papers and 
attend hearings334 – debtors must be sufficiently informed and the 
process for claiming exemptions must be easily navigable and 
affordable.  If states rely on anti-garnishment laws to preserve 
debtors’ dignity and ability to meet their basic needs, banks should 
be required to verify that the funds are not exempt before 
executing garnishment orders.335  In the U.S., banks are required to 
verify that the bank account does not contain federal benefits 
before executing a garnishment order, but most states do not 
require banks to verify that the funds are not exempt wages or 
state benefits.336  Absent such protection, the cascading harms can 
seriously impair debtors’ human rights.  For instance, an improper 
garnishment of $500 worth of Social Security Benefits caused an 
Illinois couple to miss a payment on their mortgage, triggering 
foreclosure proceedings.337 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper endeavored to provide a preliminary guide for 
those policymakers that are either obliged to or desire to craft 
responses to over-indebtedness with cognizance of human rights 
principles.  I suggested that this analysis will be different for each 
jurisdiction.  The nature of the response to over-indebtedness, 
including whether and what nature of debt relief regime is 
required, depends upon both the background legal and regulatory 
regime and also upon cultural factors.  Specifically, nations with 
more robust social safety nets may not need to provide prompt 
discharge of debt for each debtor to satisfy obligations of adequate 
                                                     
333  London Economics Report, supra note 5, at 15–16.  
334  Carter & Hobbs, supra note 144, at 8. 
335  See Carter & Hobbs, supra note 142, at 23–25 (describing state laws that 
allow creditors to clean out a debtor’s bank account completely).  
336  Carter & Hobbs, supra note 142, at 25 (citing 31 C.F.R. Part 444) 
(explaining that treasury regulation requires banks to verify that funds garnished 
are not federal benefits). 
337  Carter & Hobbs, supra note 142, at 7. 
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food and housing, for example, although their responses to over-
indebtedness will still need to account for other human right 
concerns.  Additionally, privacy protections and bans on 
discrimination in creditor practices may satisfy, at least partially, 
human rights concerns relating to debt collection.  Nations will 
also have varying needs for debt relief depending on other 
restrictions placed on consumer credit contracts.  If nations choose 
to use insolvency regimes to address human rights obligations, 
they will need to ensure that the relief is accessible and thus 
effective.  On the other hand, there may be other reasons that an 
insolvency regime will not be an effective method of satisfying 
human rights obligations, such as insufficient legal infrastructure 
or a cultural preference for resolving debt obligations communally 
outside of official debt relief proceedings. 
Although this paper did not stake a normative position on the 
need for incorporating human rights principles in responses to 
over-indebtedness, it illustrated that in many cases, particularly in 
the U.S., current responses to over-indebtedness do not fully 
satisfy human rights principles.  As discussed in much greater 
detail in Part IV, to comply with human rights principles, the U.S. 
would need, among other reforms, greater protection against 
abusive debt collection practices, greater protection of debtors’ 
adequate living standards, and debt relief that is equally available 
to all. 
Although this paper does not argue that a human rights 
framework is required in responding to over-indebtedness, I will 
identify some benefits to a debt relief system that takes into 
account human rights concerns.  First, a robust, equitable, 
accessible insolvency regime may aid a nation in fulfilling its 
obligation to meet human rights goals, such as providing for its 
non-debtor residents’ essential needs for food, housing and 
healthcare.  It is costly to offer a welfare system that ensures that 
all residents have access to food, housing, and medical care.  Some 
over-indebted individuals may not need to tap the social welfare 
system in order to meet their needs – they may need only to reduce 
their debt loads in order to have disposable income sufficient to 
satisfy these needs.  In other words, creditors rather than taxpayers 
can bear some of the cost of restoring such individuals to a level of 
basic health and safety.338  Creditors can bear more of the burden 
                                                     
338  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 36: “Individuals trapped in an 
endless debt cycle consumer previous social benefits, especially but not 
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for debtors whose income shortfalls have been caused primarily by 
over-indebtedness, and government funds can be freed to satisfy 
the obligations of impoverished individuals for whom debt relief is 
no help.339  Nations that have undertaken human rights obligations 
to provide residents with access to food, housing, and healthcare 
may wish to use their insolvency regime to defray the cost of 
meeting such obligations, particularly where their ability to 
provide a robust social safety net has been curtailed by the 
economic downturn.  Importantly, governments must also realize 
that failing to provide an adequate social safety net, particularly in 
the healthcare and housing contexts, can be the direct cause of 
over-indebtedness that imperils debtors’ human rights obligations. 
Second, a robust, equitable, and accessible insolvency regime 
may be one tool for responding to systemic risk concerns.  For 
example, had U.S. lawmakers considered seriously the rights to 
privacy, adequate housing, and dignity, they may have permitted 
modification of mortgage lenders’ claims in bankruptcy, which in 
turn may have mitigated the effects of the housing crisis.340  
Insolvency regimes that take into account human rights concerns 
are more likely to be impactful from an economic standpoint. This 
is because debtors should be able to adjust and reintegrate into the 
economy more readily if the available debt relief, in conjunction 
with any relief the state makes available outside the insolvency 
                                                     
exclusively in states that provide some measure of social support (welfare).” 
These include unemployment benefits, food stamps, health benefits, and child 
allowances.  Of course, impoverished individuals who do not carry debt loads, or 
for whom debt relief is not a long-term solution given lack of income, will not 
benefit from a robust insolvency regime.  The cost of rehabilitating these 
individuals must be born by the government rather than creditors; such 
individuals will require relief from the public social safety net in order to meet 
their basic needs.   
339  World Bank Report, supra note 1, at 12. 
[F]ar from every overburdened debtor faces social exclusion and 
utter destitution.  Lack of resources to meet basic needs may well 
lead to problems managing debt, but these problems do not always 
appear together . . . .  An insolvency regime serves mainly 
individuals who do not suffer from a long-term disability or 
general surfeit of resources and who thus do not need affirmative 
social support.  Insolvency regimes are designed primarily and 
work best for individuals who are not capable of producing 
sufficient income to support themselves and their families, but an 
overwhelming debt burden saps their initiative and depresses their 
productive capacity. 
Id. at 11–12. 
340  Levitin, supra note 33, at 585. 
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system, enables the debtor to access adequate food, housing, and 
healthcare, protects dignity, privacy, and property, and is equitable 
and accessible.  A human rights lens also promotes economic 
stability by amply protecting creditors’ rights to property and due 
process. 
In a subsequent paper, I argue that a human rights framework 
is a beneficial lens for debtor-creditor relationships.  If this 
argument is persuasive, there is much more work to be done:  each 
of the human rights discussed here play a role in many aspects of 
consumer credit, from the regulatory regime, to the creation of 
consumer credit relationships, to every facet of enforcement and 
resolution of these contracts.  For example, the right to education 
has implications for the resolution of student debt, particularly in 
the United States where many students are unable to receive an 
education without undertaking crippling debt obligations.341  As 
the flow of credit becomes increasingly international, as individual 
consumers increasingly cross borders, and as creditors increasingly 
operate internationally, it is only sensible to apply the best tools 
available for establishing minimal obligations of justice – and 
human rights continues to be the best framework available for such 
a task.  
 
                                                     
341  See, e.g., Meta Brown, Student Debt Overview: Postsecondary National Policy 
Institute (PNPI) 8/14/13, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/regional/Brown_presentation_GWU_2013Q2.pdf 
(describing “aggregate student debt balances approaching $1 trillion”); Peter Coy, 
Student Loans: Debt for Life, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-06/student-loans-debt-for-life 
(“[E]stimat[ing] that student debt, compounded by rising enrollments, is growing 
by nearly $3,000 a second.”). 
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